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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties directly involved are Arco Electric, Inc., 
Petitioner, and the Utah State Tax Commission, Repondent. 
However, the appeal involves sales taxes, the incidence of which 
will fall on Granite School District and the Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints. At the Tax Commission level, this case also involved 
sales taxes which would have fallen on the Utah Transit 
Authority, but those were decided in favor of Arco and Utah 
Transit Authority and no appeal of that portion of the case .has 
been made. The issue to be decided is also material to other 
cases filed before the Tax Commission and the Supreme Court by 
other petitioners and involving other tax-exempt entities, the 
exact identities of which are not all known to Petitioner. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review the Utah State Tax Commission's decision in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(a) Issues for Review: 
1. Whether Granite School District's ("Granite") 
purchases of materials to be installed in the construction 
of two school buildings by a subcontractor (Arco), were 
subject to sales or use tax. 
2. Whether the activities of Granite must rise 
to the level of a "real property contractor" before its 
purchases of materials for use in the construction of school 
buildings can qualify for exemption from sales and use 
taxes. 
3. Whether the act of installation by Arco of 
materials purchased by Granite into school buildings 
constitutes a taxable event for sales or use tax purposes. 
4. Whether the Tax Commission findings and 
conclusions that Arco was the purchaser, owner and consumer 
of materials purchased and furnished by Granite was 
supported by the evidence and law. 
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(Additional issues for review have been identified in the 
companion brief of Arco with Respect to the LDS Church Related 
Assessment.) 
(b) Standard for Review: This appeal presents 
questions of law and questions of law and fact. Arco submits the 
Tax Commission has (1) erroneously interpreted and applied the 
law, (2) taken action contrary to its own rules and (3) taken 
action contrary to the Tax Commissions prior practise without any 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency. Thus, the 
applicable standard of review is the correction-of-error 
standard. Bevans v. Industrial Commission. 790 P.2d 573, 576 (U. 
App. 1990). Accordingly, the Court should review the Tax 
Commission's ruling for correctness but accord no deference to 
the Tax Commission's interpretation of the law. This Court is 
free to render an independent interpretation of the questions of 
law at issue in this case. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); 
Savage Indus. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commfny 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 
1991); Ron K. Case Roofing & Asphalt Pavings, Inc. v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382 (1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt lake City 
Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust 
Co., 770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988); Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 
(Utah 1988); and Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1989). As for any factual findings of the Tax Commission, the 
standard of review is whether the finding is supported by 
substantial evidence. Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The decision of that portion of this case relating to 
Granite depends upon the interpretation of the following statutes 
and Tax Commission rules. 
(a) Statutes: The principal statutes are Utah Code 
Ann. SS 59-12-103(1)(a) and 59-12-104(2) set forth below: 
59-12-103(l)(a): 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for 
the amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) . retail sales of tangible personal 
property made within the state; 
59-12-104(2): 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the 
taxes imposed by this chapter: 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its 
political subdivisions; 
Also relevant are the definitions found in Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-102(8) and (10). That section and the complete text of 
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each of the statutes and rules cited herein are set forth in 
Addendum A. 
(b) Rules: 
(1) Tax Commission Rule R 865-19-42S (Utah 
Administrative Code): 
Sales to the State of Utah and its Subdivisions 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section 59-12-104, 
Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments 
and institutions or to its political subdivisions such 
as counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water 
districts are exempt from tax if such property for use 
in the exercise of an essential governmental function. 
If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn upon the 
state treasurer or the official disbursing agent of any 
political subdivision, the sale is considered as being 
made to the state of Utah or its political subdivisions 
and exempt from tax. 
Utah Administrative Code R865-19-42S. 
(2) Tax Commission Rule R 865-19-58S: 
Materials and Supplies Sold to Owners, Contractors and 
Repairmen of Real Property Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 59-12-102 and 59-12-103. 
1. The person who converts the personal property 
into real property is the consumer of the personal 
property since he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable 
institutions and government agencies are exempt only if 
sold as tangible personal property and the seller does 
not install the material as an improvement to realty or 
use it to repair real property. 
Utah Administrative Code R865-19-58S(A)(1) and (4). 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
(a) Nature of Case and Disposition; This case started 
with a 1987 audit of Arco by the Tax Commission's Auditing 
Division. On July 30, 1987, Arco was assessed sales tax on 
electrical materials installed by Arco under contracts or 
subcontracts involving three separate owners: (1) the LDS Print 
Center constructed for the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ("LDS Church"), 
(2) a physical facilities building constructed for the Utah 
Transit Authority ("UTA") and (3) two elementary school buildings 
constructed for the Granite School District ("Granite"), (The 
LDS Church, UTA and Granite will collectively be referred to as 
the "Owners".) 
These three construction projects were separate and 
distinct from each other. Separate contract documents were 
entered into for each project between the Owners and a general 
contractor or subcontractor. Arco's common thread in these three 
projects was that Arco installed materials in each project and 
Arco was assessed sales tax with respect to materials purchased 
by each of these entities. Under each of the separate contracts, 
the Owners reserved the right to purchase materials to be 
incorporated or installed in the projects. 
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The Owners are all tax-exempt entities, the LDS Church 
is a religious and charitable organization and UTA and Granite 
are political subdivisions of the State of Utah. 
The materials installed by Arco which are at issue in 
this case were purchased directly by the Owners from vendors 
other than Arco. No sales tax was paid on those purchases. The 
title to those materials passed directly from the vendors to the 
Owners, and the vendors looked solely to the Owners for payment 
of the materials purchased. 
Arco filed a timely petition for redetermination of the 
assessment. At the formal hearing on the petition held on August 
27, 28 and 29, 1991, Arco contended that the Owners were the 
purchasers of the materials and no sales tax was owing because 
sales to religious and charitable organizations and political 
subdivisions are exempt from sales tax by statute. Even though 
the assessment was made against Arco, the real parties in 
interest are the Owners because the burden of the assessment will 
pass to them. 
At the formal hearing, the Auditing Division of the Tax 
Commission contended that because Arco installed the materials 
into the physical structures, Arco should be considered to have 
used or "consumed" the materials, and based on such use Arco was 
deemed the purchaser of those materials. 
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In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final 
Decision dated March 10, 1992 ("Findings"), the Tax Commission 
concluded that if a tax-exempt entity makes a purchase of an item 
for conversion to real property by another person or entity, the 
purchase is not exempt from sales and use tax because the person 
who converts the item to real property is the consumer of such 
item. The Commission's Final Decision is attached on Addendum B. 
The Tax Commission further concluded that the overall activities 
of the tax-exempt entity must rise to the level of a "real 
property contractor" before the purchase of an item by the 
tax-exempt entity for conversion to real property would be exempt 
from sales or use tax. 
In applying these conclusions to the three separate 
construction projects at issue, the Tax Commission ruled that the 
activities of UTA rose to the level of a "real property 
contractor" but that the activities of the LDS Church and Granite 
did not. That portion of the sales tax assessment against Arco 
which was attributable to purchases by UTA was accordingly abated 
while that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases 
made by the LDS Church and Granite was upheld. 
This petition for review relates only to that portion 
of the assessment attributable to purchases made by the LDS 
Church and Granite. Because the fact situation, contract 
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documents and applicable law relating to these two remaining 
projects are different, two separate briefs are being filed, one 
relating to that portion of the assessment attributable to 
purchases made by the LDS Church and this brief relating only to 
that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases made by 
Granite. Granite, however, joins in the arguments set out in the 
argument portion of the LDS Church's brief. 
(b) Statement of Facts (with Respect to Granite 
Related Assessment); 
1. The taxes at issue are sales and use taxes 
for the period commencing January 1, 1982 to March 31, 1987. 
Findings p. 7.— 
2. Granite is a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah. jid. p. 7. 
3. Westbrook Elementary School and Valley Crest 
Elementary School ("the schools") were constructed pursuant 
to an agreement between Granite and Broderick & Howell 
1/ References to the record will be to the Commission's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision 
("Findings" or "Conclusions") attached as Addendum B; the 
Stipulation of Facts entered into by Granite and the Audit 
Division; and the Transcript ("Tr.")„ The hearing relating 
to Arco lasted three days, August 27, 28 and 29, 1991. 
August 27th related to the UTA. August 28th addressed 
Granite and August 29th dealt with the LDS Church. Unless 
otherwise indicated all transcript references are to the 
August 28th transcript. 
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Construction Company (hereinafter Broderick & Howell) dated 
July 18, 1984 (the "Agreement"). Id. p. 7. 
4. Broderick & Howell was selected by Granite as 
the general contractor after submission of bids by Broderick 
& Howell and other contractors for the construction of the 
schools. Id. p. 7. Such bids were submitted after review 
of architectural plans, bid specifications, general and 
supplementary general conditions and other documents. 
Stipulation of Facts, p. 2. Tr. pp. 100, 119-120. 
5. Granite's right to purchase materials and 
equipment used in the construction of the schools is set 
forth in the Supplementary General Conditions which were 
made available to all general contractor and subcontractor 
bidders on the project prior to the actual bidding process. 
The Tax Commission relied exclusively on some of these 
provisions in arriving at its decision. Accordingly those 
provisions are summarized in detail: 
a. The bid price submitted by the contractor 
included all labor, plant, materials, equipment, 
transportation, services and any other items required 
for construction and completion of the project. 
b. The contractor and any subcontractors agreed 
to allow Granite as owner to purchase directly any part 
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or all of the materials and equipment which would 
become a part of the schools. 
c. The contractor would negotiate, and 
administer all direct purchases by Granite and furnish 
to Granite a description, source of supply and other 
information necessary to enable Granite to purchase 
directly the materials and equipment. 
d. Purchases by Granite would be made on 
requisition or purchase orders furnished by Granite and 
signed by Granite's purchasing agent. 
e. Title to all materials and equipment 
purchased by Granite passed from the vendor directly to 
Granite upon delivery to the job site without any 
vesting in the contractor. 
f. After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, 
theft, vandalism, or destruction of or to the materials 
and equipment purchased directly by Granite were to lie 
with the contractor. 
g. Storage of any materials and equipment 
furnished by Granite was the responsibility of the 
contractor. 
h. The contractor was required to hold Granite 
harmless of and from any failure of the materials or 
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equipment purchased by Granite which resulted in any 
loss, claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in delivery or 
any problem relating to the materials or equipment, 
i. The contractor was required to acknowledge 
receipt and approval of any materials or equipment 
purchased directly by Granite by signing the invoice 
for those materials or equipment. 
j. Granite was required to make payment for 
those materials and equipment within a reasonable time 
after the receipt of the signed invoice from the 
contractor. 
k. Granite was not responsible for the loss of 
any prompt payment discount from the purchase price if 
the owner made payment within ten business days 
following the receipt of the signed invoice from the 
contractor. 
1. The contract price was reduced by the amount 
actually paid by Granite for the materials and 
equipment purchased directly by Granite and by the 
sales tax which would have been paid on such materials 
and equipment had they been supplied by the contractor. 
Similarly, the amount of any progress payment was 
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adjusted to reflect the direct purchase of materials 
and equipment by Granite• 
m. Granite was not responsible for the loss or 
reduction of any trade discounts available to the 
contractor as a result of any purchases made by 
Granite. 
n. All bonds and insurance called for in the 
Agreement remained in full force. No reduction in the 
amount of coverage or any deduction for premiums for 
those bonds and insurance was authorized in the 
Agreement. 
o. The provisions for direct purchase by Granite 
of materials and equipment did not relieve the 
contractor of any of its duties or obligations under 
the Agreement or constitute a waiver of any of 
Granite's rights. Findings pp. 9-10. 
6* Arco was a subcontractor of Broderick & 
Howell and performed electrical subcontract work pursuant to 
two separate Subcontract Agreements with Broderick & Howell. 
Both Subcontract Agreements are identical. Id. p. 10. 
7. The General and Supplementary General 
Conditions between Granite and Broderick & Howell were 
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incorporated into the subcontract agreements between Arco 
and Broderick & Howell by reference. Id. p. 10. 
8. Unrefuted testimony at the hearing 
demonstrated that the actual conduct and practices of the 
parties clarified gaps or ambiguities in the contract 
language and in some respects varied from the contract 
language. Some examples include: 
(a) Broderick & Howell received, with 
Granite's consent, a refund on the performance and 
payment bond premium to reflect the reduction in the 
total amount of the contract attributable to the amount 
of materials purchased by Granite even though the 
contract did not provide for such a reduction. Tr. pp. 
143, 150-151, 170. 
(b) Risk of loss for materials purchased by 
Granite was covered under an insurance policy 
maintained by Granite even though the agreement placed 
risk of loss on Broderick & Howell. Findings p. 12. 
In fact, when a theft of electrical materials from the 
jobsite actually occurred, Granite's insurance carrier 
covered the loss. Tr. pp. 47-48, 131. 
(c) The parties considered their 
relationships and obligations different with respect to 
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materials purchased by Granite as compared to materials 
purchased by Broderick & Howell or Arco even though the 
contract provisions suggested otherwise, Tr. pp. 41, 
42, 44, 49, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 142, 147, 168, 
176. Many of these differences are explained in more 
detail below. 
9. Pursuant to the Agreement, Granite elected to 
purchase and furnish certain electrical materials and 
equipment incorporated into the schools by Arco. Findings 
p. 10. 
10. Materials and equipment Granite elected not 
to purchase were purchased and furnished by Broderick & 
Howell or Arco or other subcontractors and sales tax was 
paid on such materials. Id. p. 10; Tr. p. 40. 
11. With respect to materials and equipment 
elected to be purchased and furnished by Granite, Broderick 
& Howell would prepare and deliver to Granite a requisition 
form identifying materials and equipment and the suggested 
suppliers of the materials and equipment. Findings p. 
10-11. 
12. Granite was free to purchase the materials 
and equipment from suppliers identified by Broderick & 
Howell or from other suppliers. Tr. pp. 38-39, 130. 
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13. When the requisition form was received by 
Granite, a purchase order was then issued by Granite to the 
supplier selected by Granite. Findings p. 11; Tr. pp. 
38-39, 130. The purchase order contained a certification 
from Granite that the items purchased would be used in an 
essential government education function and were exempt from 
sales and use taxes, citing sales tax regulations 
R865-19-42S (Utah Administrative Code) as authority. Tr. 
p. 16. 
14. When the materials and equipment were 
delivered to the job site address, the supplier sent an 
invoice for the materials and equipment to Granite in care 
of Broderick & Howell for approval and payment. Findings p. 
11. 
15. The authorized agent of Broderick & Howell 
would acknowledge receipt and approval of the materials and 
equipment identified in the invoice by signing the invoice 
and then forwarding it to Granite for payment. Id. p. 11. 
Invoices for electrical materials purchased by Granite to be 
installed by Arco were not sent to Arco nor did Arco sign 
off on such invoices. Tr. p. 81. 
16. With respect to signing off on invoices sent 
by suppliers of materials purchased by Granite, Broderick & 
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Howell considered itself Granite's agent in verifying that 
the invoice items had been delivered and met specifications. 
Id, p. 125. Granite had the power to pay any invoice 
without signing off by Broderick & Howell. Id. p. 142. 
17. Once approved by Granite for payment, the 
invoice would then be paid by a Granite check drawn on the 
operating account of Granite by the disbursing agent of 
Granite. Findings p. 11. 
18. After Granite made payment for the materials 
and equipment, a change order to the Agreement with 
Broderick & Howell was executed giving Granite credit for 
the cost of the materials and equipment purchased by Granite 
plus the sales tax savings associated with the materials and 
equipment. Id. p. 11. 
19. The change order had the effect of an 
amendment to the Agreement removing the amount of the 
directly purchased materials from the Agreement. Tr. p. 
107-108, 127, 134. 
20. Suppliers and vendors of materials purchased 
directly by Granite looked solely to Granite for payment and 
not to either Broderick & Howell or Arco. Tr. pp. 15-16. 
21. Neither Broderick & Howell nor Arco 
considered themselves liable in any manner to a vendor or 
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supplier if Granite failed to make payment for materials 
purchased directly by Granite. Tr. pp. 41, 128. 
22. Granite had no authority to bind Arco or 
Broderick & Howell to any purchase obligations incurred by 
Granite with respect to materials purchased directly by 
Granite. Tr. pp. 42, 128. 
23. Granite employed M.H.T. Architects, Inc. to 
provide various professional services with respect to the 
construction of the schools, including the observation of 
installation and construction efforts, testing of material, 
approval of change order(s) and the ability to stop the 
construction process at any time. Findings pp. 11-12; Tr. 
pp. 103-105. To perform these duties, M.H.T. would visit 
the job site on a frequent basis. Tr. p. 103. 
24. M.H.T. had no contractual relationship with 
Broderick & Howell or Arco, Findings p. 12, and was 
designated as Granite's agent in the Agreement. Stipulation 
of Facts, Exhibit A pp. 4-6. 
25. Through its contract with Granite, M.H.T. 
would hire engineering consultants to inspect materials 
furnished to the job site for installation and to test and 
inspect installation and construction work performed. Tr. 
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p. 174. Such consultants reported directly to M.H.T. or 
Granite and not to Broderick & Howell or Arco. Tr. p. 174. 
26. In addition to the agent and supervising 
activities of M.H.T., Granite had a full time employee who 
was a construction inspector who visited the job sites on a 
daily basis to check on progress, inspect materials and 
generally observe conditions. That employee would report 
back to his supervisor and Granite's administration. Tr. 
pp. 172-173. 
27. Another employee of Granite with an 
architecture degree and background periodically inspected 
the job sites, received reports from the construction 
inspector described in Fact 26 above and communicated with 
M.H.T. Id. pp. 171-172. 
28. Granite maintains its own security department 
and during the construction of the schools, the security 
department patrolled the job sites and security around the 
job sites was increased. Id. pp. 172-173. 
29. At all times during the installation and 
construction process and pursuant to the Agreement, Granite 
maintained a general liability insurance policy covering 
among other things, theft, vandalism and casualty losses 
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from materials and equipment purchased by Granite and used 
in the construction of the schools. Findings p. 12. 
30. During the course of construction of the 
schools, electrical materials purchased by Granite and 
stored at the job site were stolen from the job site and 
Granite's insurance carrier covered the loss. Tr. pp. 47-48 
and p. 131. 
31. Granite also maintained a fire and extended 
coverage insurance policy in the amount of the insurable 
value of the schools. Findings p. 12. 
32. Insurance maintained by Broderick & Howell 
and Arco covered general liability only and did not cover 
risk of loss or liability with respect to materials 
purchased by Granite. Tr. pp. 46-47, 130-131. 
33. Lien waivers were secured by Broderick & 
Howell with respect to materials and equipment furnished by 
Arco or by Broderick & Howell. Findings p. 12. 
34. Lien waivers were not secured by Broderick & 
Howell or Arco for materials and equipment furnished by 
Granite. Granite1s cancelled checks were accepted in place 
of lien waivers. Id. p. 12. 
35. Any excess materials purchased by Granite 
were the property of Granite, Id. p. 12, whereas Broderick & 
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Howell testified that any excess material purchased by it 
belonged to it. Tr. p. 147. 
36. Materials purchased directly by Granite for 
installation into the schools were delivered to the job site 
and not to Broderick & Howell or Arco. Tr. pp. 14, 122. 
37. Materials purchased directly from suppliers 
were paid for in full by Granite without any 10% retainage. 
Id. p. 15. 
38. At no time during construction did Arco or 
Broderick & Howell consider Granite as their agent to 
purchase materials for installation into the schools. Id. 
pp0 42, 128. 
39. Materials purchased by Granite and delivered 
to the job sties for incorporation into the schools remained 
the property of Granite. Arco or Broderick & Howell had no 
right to remove the items from the job site or use them in 
other projects. Id. pp. 44, 130. 
40. However, Arco could remove materials 
purchased by it from the job site and replace them with 
comparable materials. Id. p. 45. 
41. All manufacturer and supplier warranties on 
materials purchased directly by Granite ran directly to 
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Granite rather than to Arco or Broderick & Howell, 
Id, pp. 132-133. 
42. The duties of Broderick & Howell under labor 
or installation only contracts entered into by Broderick & 
Howell with other owners with respect to materials supplied 
or furnished by the owner for installation have been 
essentially the same as under the Agreement with Granite. 
Id. pp. 138-139. 
43. If a problem developed with respect to 
materials purchased by Granite and installed by Arco or 
Broderick & Howell, Granite would attempt at its expense to 
identify the source of the problem such as a defective item 
or unsatisfactory workmanship and then pursue the 
appropriate supplier or installer to rectify the problem. 
Id. p. 168. 
44. With respect to materials purchased by 
Granite, Arco or Broderick & Howell considered themselves 
liable to Granite for defective workmanship but not for 
defective materials. Id. pp. 49, 132-133. 
45. Granite considered itself more vulnerable to 
liability for materials purchased by Granite than materials 
purchased by Broderick & Howell or Arco. Id. p. 175. 
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46. Granite has used the direct purchase program 
described above for approximately 10-15 years with the 
understanding the program complied with applicable sales tax 
rules and regulations. Id. p. 169-170. 
47. Other tax-exempt entities have followed 
substantially the same direct purchase procedures as Granite 
and vendors and suppliers are aware of such procedures. 
Id. pp. 19, 28. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The direct purchase procedures used by Granite in this 
case to qualify for exemption from Utah sales and use taxes 
comply with the governing statute, the Tax Commission's own 
rules, and follow the guidance of this Court. Sales of tangible 
personal property to Granite, as a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, are specifically exempt from sales and use taxes 
by statute. Because Granite purchased and paid for the subject 
materials which were incorporated into the schools owned by 
Granite, the sale of the. materials was specifically exempt under 
the Tax Commission's own rule (Rule 42S infra). 
The Audit Divisions assessment against Arco was 
inappropriate because Arco neither purchased nor owned the 
subject materials. A contractor or subcontractor such as Arco 
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cannot be the consumer of materials incorporated into real 
property facilities unless it is also the purchaser and owner of 
such materials. 
In prior cases, this Court has stated that if a 
political subdivision or other tax-exempt entity wishes to 
receive the benefits of the exemption with respect to materials 
used in the construction of real property facilities, it should 
purchase the materials directly or appoint the contractor as its 
agent. Granite's direct purchase procedures have followed such 
guidance. 
While Granite assigned to the general contractor 
certain bailee and agency responsibilities, the most significant 
benefits and burdens of ownership of the materials rested with 
Granite. Granite was both the title and real owner of the 
materials. 
The Tax Commission's inconsistency regarding these 
issues is evident in its own contradictory conclusions of law and 
in its contradictory decisions in essentially identical cases 
before it. No fair or rational basis has been presented for this 
inconsistency. 
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ARGUMENT 
Under Utah's statutory governmental exemption, Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-104(2), the Tax Commission's own rules and Utah 
case law, the purchases made by Granite were exempt from Utah 
sales and use taxes. 
A« MATERIALS PURCHASED AND FURNISHED BY GRANITE FOR 
INCORPORATION INTO SCHOOL BUILDINGS ARE SALES TAX 
EXEMPT IF PAID FOR BY GRANITE REGARDLESS OF WHO 
INSTALLS THEM. 
Since the 1930's Utah law has imposed a tax on retail 
sales of tangible personal property. See Utah Code Ann. 
2/ $59-12-103(1)(a).- The Code defines a retail sale as every sale 
by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer and not for 
resale. Id. S59-12-103(l)(a). The materials at issue in this 
case were purchased by Granite directly from the vendors of the 
materials for Granite's use in the construction of school 
building facilities. Granite also directly paid the vendors by 
check drawn on its operating account. Findings p. 11. Thus, 
under Utah's general sales tax framework, the purchase by Granite 
of tangible personal property materials for use in school 
The assessment at issue covers the period January 1982 
through March 1987. The relevant statutes were recodified 
and renumbered in 1987. Because the substantive provisions 
of the code did not change, Granite cites to the current 
code sections (1987 and Supp. 1991) rather than the prior 
sections. 
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building construction would be subject to Utah sales tax. 
However, the Code exempts from tax sales of tangible personal 
property "to the state, its institutions and political 
subdivisions." Id. §59-12-104(2). This exemption is sometimes 
referred to as the "governmental exemption." Thus, but for the 
governmental exemption, the sale of materials to Granite in this 
case would be subject to Utah sales tax. The obvious legislative 
intent in the statutory governmental exemption is that purchases 
made by a political subdivision such as Granite be sales tax 
free. This legislative intent is also-evident in the Tax 
Commission's Rule regarding Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104 which 
provides: 
A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments 
and institutions or to its political subdivision such 
as counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water 
districts are exempt from tax if such property [sic] 
for use in the exercise of essential government 
function. If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn 
upon the state treasurer or the official disbursing 
agent of any political subdivision, the sale is 
considered as being made to the state of Utah or its 
political subdivisions and exempt from tax. 
Utah Administrative Code, R865-19-42S ("Rule 42S") (emphasis 
added.) 
Although an "essential governmental function" 
requirement for the exemption is not imposed by statute, nor is 
it defined in the Rule, there is no question that materials 
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purchased and used by Granite in the construction of the schools 
constitutes an exercise of an essential governmental function. 
Because the sale of materials at issue was made to Granite and 
paid for by Granite by a warrant [check] drawn upon by the 
official disbursing agent of Granite, the sale of the materials 
to Granite is exempt from sales tax under the Commission's own 
rule. Id. 
Under the Commission's rule, it is immaterial if the 
materials were installed by someone other than Granite or if 
Granite, by contract, assigned some responsibilities with respect 
to such materials to someone else. All that is necessary for 
this governmental exemption to apply is that the sale be made to 
Granite for use in an essential governmental function and paid 
for by Granite. Thus, the Tax Commission's decision with respect 
to Granite is contrary to its own rule and to the statutory 
language granting the governmental exemption. 
Granite has relied on this statutory governmental 
exemption and the Commission's Rule 42S in its construction of 
new buildings. Reference to Rule 42S was specifically made in 
the purchase orders used by Granite to purchase the subject 
materials as a basis for claiming the exemption. Tr. p. 16. 
If the Commission no longer believes that Rule 42S is 
valid or does not mean what it says, it should take appropriate 
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rule making or legislative steps to repeal or modify it. Until 
such steps are taken, Granite and other political subdivisions 
should have the right to rely on the clear language of the rule. 
B. ARCO SHOULD NOT BE TAXED ON THE PURCHASE OF MATERIALS 
BECAUSE ARCO NEVER PURCHASED OR OWNED THE MATERIALS. 
In upholding the Granite-related assessment against 
Arco, the Commission ignored Section 59-12-104(2) of the Utah 
Code and its Rule 865-19-42S. Instead the Commission relied 
substantially on its interpretation of Rule 865-19-58S ("Rule 
58S") which provides in relevant part: 
1. The person who converts the personal property 
into real property is the consumer of the personal 
property since he is the last one to own it as 
personal property. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable 
institutions and government agencies are exempt 
only if sold as tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the material as an 
improvement to realty or use it to repair real 
property. 
Utah Administrative Code R865-19-58S(A)(1) and (4). (Emphasis 
added.) The Commission concluded that since Arco installed the 
materials purchased by Granite, it was, therefore, the consumer 
of the materials so that a tax should be paid on the purchase of 
the materials. 
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Arco submits that Rule 42S is determinative of the 
issues in this case, but even if this case is reviewed solely in 
the context of Rule 58S, the Commission's conclusion places 
improper emphasis on the installation process to determine if a 
taxable event has occurred. In Rule 588(A)(1), the term 
"consumer" is directly tied to the term "own." That is, in order 
for an entity to be a consumer of materials it must also be the 
owner of the materials. As applied to this case, Arco cannot be 
the consumer of the materials unless a determination is also made 
that Arco was also the owner of the materials. 
The findings of fact and unrefuted evidence presented 
at the formal hearing show that Arco was not the owner of the 
materials. Arco did not purchase the materials. Arco did not 
pay for the materials. Arco did not insure the materials. Arco 
had no contractual relationship with the vendors of the 
materials. Vendors looked solely to Granite for payment of the 
materials. Arco had no responsibility to pay for the materials 
if Granite failed to do so. Title to the materials passed from 
the vendors directly to Granite without vesting in Arco. In 
short, the assessment was improperly made against Arco because 
Arco was not the purchaser or owner of the materials. 
The recent Utah case of Tummurru Trades v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), offers additional insight 
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as to the ownership requirement of Rule 58S(1). In Tummurru 
Trades, the taxpayer purchased items to be used in construction 
projects located out of state. This Court stated: 
Because Tummurru took possession of the items 
within the State of Utah and title passed 
within the state, it became the ultimate 
consumer for sales tax purposes. 
Id. at 719 (emphasis added). This Court then noted that Rule 
58S(A)(1) "was promulgated to address this very issue." Id. at 
719. 
In essence, this Court has confirmed that in order for 
Arco to be a consumer of material for sales tax purposes under 
Rule 58S(1), it must also be the owner of the materials. If Arco 
had purchased the materials at issue and took title to them, 
Granite would not now be arguing that the governmental exemption 
is available. This matter is before this Court because Granite 
purchased the materials, paid for them, took title to them and 
used them in an essential governmental function. 
Like Rule 58S(A)(1), Rule 58S(A)(4) does not support 
the Commission's decision. Rule 58S(A)(4) provides that sales to 
a government agency are exempt from sales tax if the supplier of 
the materials, i.e., the vendor from whom the materials are 
purchased, does not also install the materials. Utah 
Administrative Code R865-19-58S(4). In this case, none of the 
suppliers from whom Granite purchased materials also installed 
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the materials. Because the materials were sold to Granite and 
not installed by the vendors, the sale of the materials was sales 
tax exempt under Rule 58S(A)(4). 
C. EVEN IF THERE IS CONFLICT OR AMBIGUITY REGARDING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF RULES 42(S) AND 58(S) ANY AMBIGUITY 
MUST BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF GRANITE. 
General principles of statutory construction apply in 
interpreting agency rules and regulations. An agency 
interpretation of a statute or regulation that is contrary to the 
plain meaning of the language should not be deferred to on 
review. See e.g. Usury v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113 
(10th Cir. 1977); Carlyle Compressor Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Commission, 683 F.2d 673 (2nd Cir. 1982). As noted 
in Carlyle, "[a]n agency does not have carte blanche to interpret 
its regulations to achieve a desired result." 683 F.2d at 673. 
A fundamental principle in construing statutes is to 
determine the intent of the legislature. Johnson v. Tax 
Commission, 411 P.2d 831# 832 (Utah, 1966). Arco and Granite 
submit that legislative intent is clear. The governmental sales 
tax exemption is available in this case because Granite purchased 
and paid for the materials at issue. Granite believes that the 
statute, Rule 42(S) and Rule 58(S) all support an exemption. 
However, even if the Court finds that some confusion, 
ambiguity or conflict exists in the statutes and rules in 
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applying the governmental sales tax exemption, the matter should 
still be resolved in favor of Arco and Granite, Utah courts have 
long held that the taxpayer is to be given the benefit of the 
doubt in construing tax statutes. In Pacific Intermountain 
Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (1958), the 
Court states: "We concede that taxing statutes are to be 
construed strictly and in favor of the taxpayer where doubtful." 
This Court's practice is to "construe taxation statutes 
liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature 
to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent 
exists." Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 
(Utah 1989). 
Thus, any conflict or confusion in applying the statute 
or rules to the facts of this case should be resolved in favor of 
Arco. If any change is to be made to the governmental sales tax 
exemption, it should be made by the legislature and not by 
selective interpretation by the Tax Commission. 
D. THE DIRECT PURCHASE PROCEDURES USED BY GRANITE FOLLOW 
THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE ON HOW TO QUALIFY FOR THE 
GOVERNMENTAL EXEMPTION AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
PUBLIC POLICY PURPOSES OF THE GOVERNMENTAL EXEMPTION. 
Several Utah cases have addressed issues related to 
those involved in this matter. These cases establish that 
purchases of materials made by a tax-exempt entity or its agent 
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for use in the construction of facilities for the tax-exempt 
entity are exempt from sales tax. 
In the case of Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State 
Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), the contractor 
purchased materials from a supplier for use in a road 
construction project for the State of Utah and argued that no 
sales tax liability should arise because the construction project 
was for the benefit of the state, a tax-exempt entity. This 
Court found, however, that because the contractor purchased the 
materials, it was the consumer of the items and sales tax 
liability resultedc In reaching its conclusion, the Court 
emphasized the fact that the suppliers looked solely to the 
contractors for payment and not to the state. Id. at 125 P.2d 
411. Significantly, however, no claim was made that the State of 
Utah had been the owner, purchaser or consumer of the materials. 
Moreover, the Court stated that had the state or its agent 
purchased the materials, no tax would have been incurred: 
It is true that under this section 
[predecessor to §59-12-104(2)] sales made 
directly by plaintiffs to the state would be 
exempted, but in the instant case the sales 
are to an independent contractor and not to an 
agent of the state. 
Id. 
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In the subsequent case of Ford J. Twaits v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 148 P.2d 343, 345 (1944), the contractor again 
argued that materials purchased by the contractor to be 
incorporated into 3 construction project for the U.S. Government 
should be sales tax exempt because the purchased materials were 
really for the benefit of the U.S. Government, a tax-exempt 
entity. The Court noted that the contractor paid for the 
materials and that title to materials did not pass to the 
government until the government paid for them through progress 
payments as the work was completed. Id. 148 P.2d at 344. Of 
particular significance to this case, the Court also noted the 
contract granted the government the right to issue tax exemption 
certificates to avoid the imposition of sales tax on materials 
purchased. No such certificates were issued, however, and the 
Court concluded the contractor was liable for sales or use tax on 
the materials purchased. The Court also stated, 
. . . it is apparent that the government did 
not intend in the instant case to exempt 
plaintiff [the contractor] from any local 
taxes. Had it so intended, it would have 
been a simple matter to authorize plaintiff 
to buy as an agent of the government, to 
issue a tax exemption referred to in Article 
31 of the Contract, or otherwise declare the 
goods government property. 
Id. 148 P.2d at 345. 
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In the case of Olson Construction Company v. State Tax 
Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961), this Court again 
reiterated that the contractor was liable for sales tax on 
materials purchased by and paid for by the contractor for use in 
a federal government construction project. 
In each of these three cases, the contractor purchased 
and paid for the materials. In this case, Granite, not Arco, 
purchased and paid for the materials. Granite is not aware of a 
prior Utah Court decision involving the availability of the 
governmental exemption where the materials at issue were 
purchased directly by the governmental entity. 
Nevada, however, has decided such a case. In Nevada 
Tax Commission v. Harker and Harker, Inc.f 699 P.2d 112 (1985), 
the contractor, Harker, acted as the agent of the City of Reno to 
procure materials for Reno to be used in the construction of a 
facility for the city. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that 
the contractor did not own the materials and rejected the Tax 
Commission's argument that the contractor was the consumer of the 
materials. The Nevada Court stated: 
. . . The Commission, however, cites to Ruling No. 
67 which provides "a construction contractor is 
the consumer of all tangible personal property 
purchased for use in improving real property 
pursuant to a construction contract." The 
commission therefore concludes that since NRS 
372.155 imposes a tax on the use, storage or other 
improving real property pursuant to a construction 
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contract." The commission therefore concludes 
that since NRS 372.155 imposes a tax on the use, 
storage or other consumption of personalty, Harker 
necessarily must pay a use tax. 
Nevertheless, to apply Ruling No. 67 to the 
present case would counter Nevada's legislative 
intent to exempt its governmental entities from 
taxation (citations omitted). A contractor in 
Harker's position, were it to be the subject of 
such tax, would certainly include in its bid the 
amount of that tax. Thus the state by taxing a 
governmental contractor acting as a conduit for 
the government, would be collecting the same funds 
with the right hand that it would be paying out to 
the contractor with the left hand. To extend 
Ruling No. 67 to this situation would require the 
state to engage in a costly and circuitous 
exercise which would be unproductive and 
unconscionable. . . . 
We therefore conclude that Harker did not 
have sufficient incidence of ownership to warrant 
imposition of a use tax. Harker was acting as a 
mere conduit for the governmental entity thus any 
tax imposed upon Harker is necessary a tax imposed 
upon the governmental entity. The tax exempt 
entities are meant to remain as such and therefore 
Ruling No. 67 cannot be construed to apply in this 
situation. _Id. at 114. 
Granite is not aware of a Utah case that addresses this 
public policy in a sales tax setting similar to Harper. This 
Court, however, used essentially the same reasoning in the real 
property taxation case of Interwest Aviation v. County Board of 
Equalization, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987). The Court explained the 
basis for the governmental exemption as follows: 
Article XIII, S2 of the Utah Constitution and 
S59-2-1 exempt from taxation "property of" 
cities and other governmental bodies. The 
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exemption is based on the policy that 
property owned by and used for the public 
benefit of one governmental entity or 
subdivision should not be taxed by another 
because that would defeat the purpose of the 
exemption. For one unit of government, for 
example, a city, to have to levy a tax so 
that it can pay taxes to another overlapping 
unit, for example, a county, makes little 
economic sense and is bad tax policy. In 
other words, county taxation of city-owned 
property would necessarily require additional 
taxation by the city of its taxpayers for the 
revenue to pay the county-imposed tax. 
Id. at 1225. 
Certainly the same public policy reasons apply in 
the sales tax arena. When a political subdivision, like 
Granite, is the purchaser, owner and true ultimate consumer 
of materials used in the construction of a school building, 
does it really make sense to collect sales tax from the 
political subdivision for the benefit of either the same or 
other political subdivisions? This is precisely the effect 
of the Tax Commission's holding in this case. The 
Commission undermines the very purpose for the governmental 
tax exemption and the legislative intent in granting the 
exemption. 
E. GRANITE WAS THE LEGAL AND REAL OWNER OF THE MATERIALS 
PURCHASED BY GRANITE 
In its decision the Tax Commission concluded that Arco 
bore the risks of ownership with respect to materials purchased 
-36-
directly by Granite and that Granite "did not assume the burdens, 
risks, responsibilities and incidents of ownership" of such 
materials. Such bold conclusions are inconsistent with the 
governing documents, the unrefuted evidence presented at the 
hearing and the Tax Commission's own findings. 
In the first place, it is true that Granite delegated 
to Broderick & Howell, the general contractor in this case (and 
not Arco), certain responsibilities with respect to the materials 
at issue, including responsibilities for storage, inspection and 
safe keeping of the materials once delivered to the job site. 
However, these responsibilities would frequently be found in an 
installation only contract and are typical of the obligations 
imposed on a bailee of materials in similar situations. 
Further, when all of the evidence is looked at together 
(and not only just selected provisions of the Agreement), Granite 
and not Arco was the real owner and held the most significant 
"incidents of ownership" of the materials. Granite provided the 
specifications for the materials in the first place. Granite 
contractually reserved the right to purchase materials and alter 
the original Agreement. This right was exercised by Granite and 
with respect to Granite-purchased items, the Agreement was 
modified by change order to essentially an installation only 
contract. Granite, not Arco, submitted purchase orders to 
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suppliers. Granite, not Arco, purchased the materials. Granite, 
not Arco, paid for the materials. Suppliers looked solely to 
Granite and not Arco for payment of the materials. Arco had no 
liability to such suppliers if Granite failed to pay for the 
materials. Any responsibility assigned to Arco or Broderick & 
Howell with respect to risk of loss was eliminated by the fact 
that Granite, not Arco, insured the materials against such risks 
and paid the premiums on such insurance. As a specific example 
in this case, Granite's insurance company covered the loss of 
electrical materials stolen from the job site, which materials 
were to be installed by Arco. Warranties on the materials ran to 
Granite, not Arco. Granite, not Arco, was the ultimate consumer 
of the materials (i.e., the materials were incorporated into a 
school building maintained by Granite in the exercise of its 
essential governmental functions). Legal and real title to the 
materials passed from the suppliers to Granite without any 
vesting in Arco. Surplus materials belonged to Granite, not 
Arco. Granite had full-time employees and independently hired 
architects and contractors to inspect materials and supervise the 
installation process. Granite made the final decision as to 
which materials to purchase. Granite had the right to accept or 
reject suppliers of materials recommended by Arco or Broderick & 
Howell. Granite could do whatever it wanted with the materials 
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it purchased. If a problem developed with respect to materials 
purchased by Granite, Granite would, at its expense, attempt to 
identify the source of the problem such as defective material or 
unsatisfactory workmanship and then pursue the appropriate 
supplier or installer to rectify the problem. Arco concluded it 
had no liability with respect to defective materials purchased by 
Granite. 
As set forth in the facts above, the contract documents 
and the evidence presented at the formal hearing demonstrated 
that Granite was the owner of the materials. The Commission 
attempts to avoid that conclusion by selective quotation of the 
contract documents. The actual conduct and practices of the 
parties clarified any gaps or ambiguities in the contract 
language and in some respects may have amended the contract 
language. Under Utah law the actions, understanding and conduct 
of the parties can be looked at to interpret contract language 
and to even modify contract language that otherwise appears clear 
on its face. See Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 
(Utah 1981); Bull Frog Marina v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 
266 (1972); Builough v. Simsf 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965). 
Thus, when the documents and evidence is looked at as a whole, 
the conclusion is that Granite, not Arco, was the owner of the 
materials. 
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The essence of Arco's involvement in this case was as 
an installer of materials purchased by Granite. It also shared 
with Broderick & Howell agency responsibilities in identifying 
suppliers of materials and receiving such materials prior to 
installation. The assumption by Arco of such agency and bailee 
responsibilities does not make Arco the owner of the materials. 
When all of the facts and circumstances of the 
relationship between Arco and Granite are examined, including the 
actions and conduct of the parties, the preponderance of the 
benefits and burdens of ownership of the materials remained with 
Granite. Granite was both the purchaser and real owner of the 
subject materials. Under any interpretation of the relative 
Rules, Granite is entitled to the exemption. 
P. THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION IN THE GRANITE PORTION OF 
THIS CASE IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS PRIOR PRACTICES AND 
ITS DECISIONS IN PRIOR OR COMPANION EXEMPTION CASES. 
As set forth in the facts, the direct purchase 
procedures used by Granite in this case were substantially the 
same as those used by other tax-exempt entities in similar fact 
situations. These procedures have been successfully used by 
Granite and other tax-exempt entities for numerous years. 
Beginning in approximately 1985, however, several contractors and 
subcontractors were audited and assessed sales tax by the Tax 
Commission with respect to materials purchased by tax-exempt 
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entities using the same basic direct purchase procedures as in 
this case. This assessment activity resulted in approximately 30 
separate but similar cases before the Commission challenging the 
assessments. These cases involve several tax-exempt entities 
including political subdivisions such as Salt Lake County and 
school districts and several charitable organizations. 
The first significant decision out of this collection 
of cases was decided by the Commission in the case of Home 
Construction Corp. v. Audit Division of the State Tax Commission 
Appeal No. 85-0118 (November 25, 1987), involving the direct 
purchase of construction materials by the Uintah County School 
District. A copy of the Home decision is attached hereto as 
Addendum C. The facts in Home are remarkably similar to the 
facts in this case, and the governing contract language is 
virtually identical. In Home, the Commission ruled that the 
purchases were exempt based in significant part on the actions 
and conduct of the parties in the direct purchase arrangement. 
One difference between the Home case and this case is 
that Uintah County entered into contracts directly with 
subcontractors, whereas Granite had no direct contractual 
relationship with the subcontractors. Rather, the contractual 
relationship existed between the contractor, Broderick & Howell 
and the subcontractors, including Arco. That difference, 
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however, has no bearing on whether Granite or Arco purchased 
materials. Moreover, Granite and its employees and agents 
clearly had the right to control and in fact exercised 
substantial control and supervision over the construction of the 
two school buildings facilities, just as Uintah County's 
employees did in Home. 
After Home the Commission sent a memorandum dated June 
13, 1990 to petitioners in the approximate 30 cases pending 
before the Commission involving direct purchases by tax-exempt 
entities, a copy of which memorandum is attached hereto as 
Addendum D. In such memorandum, the Commission explained its 
position on the direct purchase procedures and outlined a 
four-part safe harbor to qualify for the exemption. The 
Commission's "minimum criteria" were: 
1. The exempt organization must exercise direct 
supervision over the construction project. 
2. Purchase orders must be issued by the exempt 
organization for all materials for which sales tax is 
not paid. 
3. Payment must be made by the exempt 
organization for all materials for which sales tax is 
not paid. 
4. Any furnish and install contracts entered into 
must have provisions in the contract for changes 
through change orders. 
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All four parts of the test announced in the memorandum 
are present in this case. Granite exercised direct supervision 
over the construction project, issued the purchase orders, and 
paid for the materials, and the Agreement specifically allowed 
for changes through change orders. The Commission's decision in 
this case is inconsistent with the four-part safe harbor test 
announced in the memorandum. 
Another case recently decided by the Tax Commission was 
Layton Construction Co. v. The Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, Appeal No. 86-0650 (March 9, 1992), 
involving the direct purchase of materials by BYU. A copy of the 
decision in Layton is attached hereto as Addendum E. Again, the 
facts in Layton Construction are remarkably similar to the facts 
in this case, and the governing contract language is 
substantially the same. As in Home, the Commission again found 
that the purchases by BYU were tax-exempt focusing on the actions 
and conduct of the parties with respect to the direct purchase 
procedures. 
In denying the exemption to Granite in this case, the 
Commission lists only selected provisions of the Agreement as its 
basis for the denial while ignoring the conduct and actions of 
the parties and other unrefuted evidence presented at the formal 
hearing. Indeed, virtually every "negative" provision of the 
-43-
Agreement cited by the Commission to support its decision in this 
case (Findings, pps. 33-34) was also present in the contract 
documents involved in both Home and Lay ton. Such "negative" 
contract provisions were not listed as determinative factors in 
the Commission's June 13, 1990 memorandum. 
Even in its decision involving Arco, the Tax Commission 
grants the exemption in favor of UTA but not for Granite or the 
LDS Church. As set forth in detail in the LDS Church1s brief, 
the Tax Commission decision in this case cannot reasonably or 
fairly be explained with regard to the treatment of UTA vis-a-vis 
the other owners. Also as set forth in the LDS Church's brief 
the conclusions of law issued by the Commission are internally 
contradictory and inconsistent and offer confusing direction to 
taxpayers and tax exempt entities. 
There is no fair or rational basis to the inconsistency 
in these decisions and pronouncements of the Commission. In 
fact, it appears that the Commission is trying to change old 
rules and create new ones to address these direct purchase 
programs. That is not the proper function of administrative 
hearing. If that is the Commission's desire, it must first amend 
the statute and change the clear legislative intent and then it 
must go through the proper rulemaking procedures. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Arco did not purchase, own or 
consume the subject materials and therefore the assessment of 
sales tax against it was improper. Granite was the true 
purchaser, owner and ultimate consumer of such materials. 
Because Granite is a tax-exempt entity, such purchases are exempt 
from Utah sales and use tax. 
DATED this <? day of August, 1992. 
Thomas Christensen, Jr. 
John E. S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin, a 
Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Arco and Granite 
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ADDENDUM A 
59-12-102 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 12 Utah 2d 53, land Cement Co. v. State Tax Comm., 110 
362 P.2d 422 (1961). Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947). 
Purpose of use tax. Redress from assessment. 
The obvious purpose of the former Use Tax Procedure set forth in this chapter itself is 
Act was to impose a tax on the use in this state the exclusive method of seeking redress from 
of property the sale of which, because that sale an assessment. Pacific Intermountain Express 
took place outside the state, was beyond the Co. v. State Tax Comm., 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 
reach of the Utah Sales Tax Act. Union Port- P.2d 549 (1957). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Sales and Cable television equipment or services as 
Use Taxes §§ 1 to 243. subject to sales or use tax, 5 A.L.R.4th 754. 
C.J.S. — 85 C.J S. State and Local Taxation Retailer's failure to pay to government sales 
§§ 1231 to 1257. or use tax funds as constituting larceny or em-
A.L.R. — Sales or use tax on motor vehicle bezzlement, 8 A.L.R.4th 1068. 
purchased out of state, 45 A.L.R.3d 1270. Eyeglasses or other optical accessories as 
Applicability of sales tax to "tips" or service
 s u b j e c t ^ s a l e s o r uge taXf u A . L . R . 4 t h 1 3 7 0 . 
charges added in lieu of tips, 73 A.L.R.3d 1226.
 U s e o r p r i v i l e g e ^ o n 9 a l e s o f o r r e v e n U e s 
Sates and use taxes on, leaajrf tangible per-
 from g a l e s rf a d v e r t l s i o r s e r v i c e s , 4 0 
sonal property. 2 AX R.4th 859.
 A.L.R.4th 1114. 
Freight, transportation, mailing, or han-
 a , , . . r .. 
dling charges billed separately to purchaser of . S a l e s " f " " * * f ™ ? f o ^ l ^ l ^ 1 " 
goods subject to sales or use taxes, 2 A.LiUth mfr o r ^ t o m e r list, 80 A.L.R.4th 1126. 
^ 1 2 4 . Key Numbers. — Taxation *=» 1201 to 1345. 
59-12-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commercial consumption" means the use connected with trade or 
commerce and includes: 
(a) the use of services or products by retail establishments, hotels, 
motels, restaurants, warehouses, and other commercial establish-
ments; 
(b) transportation of property by land, water, or air; 
(c) agricultural uses unless specifically exempted under this chap-
ter; and 
(d) real property contracting work. 
(2) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission. 
(3) "Component part" includes: 
(a) poultry, dairy, and other livestock feed, and their components; 
(b) baling ties and twine used in the baling of hay and straw; 
(c) fuel used for providing temperature control of orchards and 
commercial greenhouses doing a majority of their business in whole-
sale sales, and for providing power for off-highway type farm machin-
ery; and 
(d) feed, seeds, and seedlings. 
(4) (a) "Medicine" means: 
(i) insulin, syringes, and any medicine prescribed for the treat-
ment of human ailments by a person authorized to prescribe 
treatments and dispensed on prescription filled by a registered 
pharmacist, or supplied to patients by a physician, surgeon, or 
podiatrist; 
(ii) any medicine dispensed to patients in a county or other 
licensed hospital if prescribed for that patient and dispensed by a 
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registered pharmacist or administered under the direction of a 
physician; and 
(iii) any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a physician or 
administered under the direction of a physician or paramedic. 
(b) "Medicine" does not include: 
(i) any auditory, prosthetic, ophthalmic, or ocular device or 
appliance; or 
(ii) any alcoholic beverage. 
(5) "Person" includes any individual, firm, partnership, joint venture, 
association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, 
this state, any county, city, municipality, district, or other local govern-
mental entity of the state, or any group or combination acting as a unit. 
(6) "Purchase price" means the amount paid or charged for tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), excluding only cash discounts taken or any excise tax im-
posed on the purchase price by the federal government. 
(7) "Residential use" means the use in or around a home, apartment 
building, sleeping quarters, and similar facilities or accommodations. 
(8) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the state of tangible per-
sonal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12*103(1), other than resale of such property, item, or service by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer. 
(b) "Retail sale" includes sales by any farmer or other agricultural 
producer of poultry, eggs, or dairy products to consumers if the sales 
have an average monthly sales value of $125 or more. 
(9) (a) "Retailer" means any person engaged in a regularly organized 
retail business in tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), and who is selling to 
the user or consumer and not for resale. 
(b) "Retailer" includes commission merchants, auctioneers, and 
any person regularly engaged in the business of selling to users or 
consumers within the state. 
(c) "Retailer" includes any person who engages in regular or sys-
tematic solicitation of a consumer market in this state by the distri-
bution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or other advertis-
ing, or by means of print, radio or television media, by mail, 
telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, cable, optic, microwave, 
or other communication system. 
(d) "Retailer" does not include farmers, gardeners, stockmen, 
poultrymen, or other growers or agricultural producers producing 
and doing business on their own premises, except those who are regu-
larly engaged in the business of buying or selling for a profit. 
(e) For purposes of this chapter the commission may regard as 
retailers the following if they determine it is necessary for the effi-
cient administration of this chapter: salesmen, representatives, ped-
dlers, or canvassers as the agents of the dealers, distributors, supervi-
sors, or employers under whom they operate or from whom they ob-
tain the tangible personal property sold by them, irrespective of 
whether they are making sales on their own behalf or on behalf of 
these dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers. 
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(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional 
or otherwise, in any manner, of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a consider-
ation. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or entertainment 
taxable under this chapter; 
(d) any transaction if the possession of property is transferred but 
the seller retains the title as security for the payment of the price; 
and 
(e) any transaction under which right to possession, operation, or 
use of any article of tangible personal property is granted under a 
lease or contract and the transfer of possession would be taxable if an 
outright sale were made. 
(11) "State" means the state of Utah, its departments, and agencies. 
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or retention of tangible personal 
property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), in this state for any purpose except sale in the regular 
course of business. 
(13) (a) "Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are 
dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged; 
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers; and 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, including 
property severed from real estate, 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest or improvements in real estate; 
(ii) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes, and other 
evidence of debt; 
(iii) insurance certificates or policies; 
(iv) personal or governmental licenses; 
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs; 
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal tender of the 
United States or of a foreign nation; and 
(vii) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, medallions, or 
decorative coins, not constituting legal tender of any nation, with 
a gold, silver, or platinum content of not less than 80%. 
(14) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over tangible 
personal property under Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the 
ownership or the leasing of that property, item, or service. 
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display, demonstration, or trial 
of that property in the regular course of business and held for resale. 
(15) "Vehicle" means any aircraft, as defined in Section 2-1-1; any ve-
hicle, as defined in Section 41-la-102; any off-highway vehicle, as defined 
in Section 41-22-2; and any vessel, as defined in Section 41-la-102; that is 
required to be titled, registered, or both. 
(16) "Vehicle dealer" means a person engaged in the business of buy-
ing, selling, or exchanging vehicles as defined in Subsection (15). 
(17) "Vendor" means: 
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(a) any person receiving any payment or consideration upon a sale 
of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service 
under Subsection 59-12-103(1), or to whom such payment or consider-
ation is payable; and 
(b) any person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of 
a consumer market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, peri-
odicals, advertising flyers, or other advertising, or by means of print, 
radio or television media, by mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer 
data base, cable, optic, microwave, or other communication system. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch. 
110, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2; 
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 1969, ch. 187, 
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152, 
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1; 
1986, ch. 55, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1988, ch. 66, 
§ 1; 1990, ch. 215, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 200. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, added present 
Subsections (15) and (16) and redesignated for-
mer Subsection (15) as Subsection (17). 
The 1990 amendment, effective July 1, 1990, 
subdivided Subsection (9), adding Subsection 
(c) and making stylistic changes, and in Sub-
section (17) added the subsection designation 
(a), added Subsection (b), and made related 
changes. 
The 1992 amendment, effective January 30, 
1992, in Subsection (15) substituted the code 
citations to § 41-la-102 for "Section 41-1-1" 
and "Section 41-1-147" respectively, and made 
stylistic changes. 
Legislative Intent — Laws 1990, ch 215, 
§ 3 provides: "The Legislature intends to make 
the changes in the definition and status of re-
tailers and vendors under this act prospective 
only. It also intends that these changes may 
not be construed to require retailers, as defined 
in Subsection 59-12-102(9)(c), and vendors, as 
defined in Subsection 59-12-102(17)(b), to pay 
or collect and remit any sales or use tax that 
may have been otherwise due and payable be-
fore July 1, 1990." 
Cross-References. — State Tax Commis-
sion, § 59-1-201 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction. 
Construction contracts 
Discharge of tax. 
Liability for tax. 
Lease or contract. 
Manufacturing equipment. 
Material for parent corporation. 
Nonresident purchaser. 
Nonresident seller 
Obligation to pay tax. 
Purchase. 
"Purchase price." 
Retail sales. 
Sales price. 
Tangible personal property. 
Transfer of title 
"Use." 
Users or consumers. 
Use tax relationship to sales tax. 
Wholesale purchases. 
Construction. 
This section and § 59-12-103 are correlative 
and complementary. Barrett Inv Co. v State 
Tax Comm.. 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P 2d 998 
(1964): Ogden Union Ry & Depot v State Tax 
Comm., 16 Utah 2d 23. 395 P 2d 57 (1964) 
Construction contracts. 
Sales of products made by a manufacturer of 
building materials to contractors for use upon 
a private construction contract are taxable un-
der the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (now 
this chapter) and subsequent amendments. 
Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v State Tax 
Comm., 101 Utah 513. 125 P 2d 408 (1942). 
Sales of personal property to a contractor 
constructing facilities for the federal govern-
ment were not exempt from sales tax, even 
though the contracts involved provided for the 
vesting of title to all material in the federal 
government upon delivery to the job site and 
even thougn there was ;n existence at the time 
the contracts were executed a sales tax regula-
tion of the commission which provided a sales 
tax exemption contrary to law Olson Constr 
Co. v State Tax Comm., 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 
P2d 1112 (1961) 
Discharge of tax. 
Tax may be discharged by payment to re-
tailer from whom goods are purchased. Ford J. 
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deemed wholesale purchases and exempt from 
the sales tax. Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax 
Comm., 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998 (1964). 
59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate. 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph corpo-
rations, whether the corporations are municipally or privately owned, for: 
(i) all transportation; 
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or 
(iii) telegraph service; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for commercial consumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
(£) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, 
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar ac-
commodations; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or 
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other 
tangible personal property; 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and ser-
vices for less than 30 consecutive days; 
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs 
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property 
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(1) shall be: 
(a) 53/32% through December 31, 1989; and (b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be: 
(a) 23/32% through December 31, 1989; and (b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be 
deposited in an Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by 
the Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the use of the Utah 
Sports Authority created under Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 3, Utah Sports 
Authority Act: 
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a x/64% tax rate on 
the taxable items and services under Subsection (1); 
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a l/e*% tax rate under 
Section 59-12-204 on the taxable items and services under Subsection 
(1); and 
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsections (i) and (ii). 
(b) These funds shall be used by the Utah Sports Authority as follows: 
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(i) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt 
service fund or to otherwise reimburse to the state of Utah any 
amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds 
issued by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in 
Section 9-1-303; and 
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative, 
legal, and other expenses of the Utah Sports Authority, but not in-
cluding protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host 
the Winter Olympic Games. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch. 
110, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2; 
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 1969, ch. 187, 
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152, 
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1; 
1986, ch. 55, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1989, ch. 41, 
§ 6; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 5; 1990, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1990, ch. 171, § 1; 1991, ch. 152, § 1; 
1992, cho 241, § 370. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted 
"5l/64%" for "5%" in Subsection (2Kb); substi-
tuted "2V64%" for "2%" in Subsection (3)(b); and 
added Subsection (4). 
The 1989 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective 
October 10,1989, substituted "5%" for "5 VuW 
in Subsection (2Kb); substituted "2%" for "2 
l/s4%" in Subsection (3)(b); subdivided Subsec-
tion (4) and rewrote the introductory language 
of Subsection (4)(a), which read: "For fiscal 
year beginning July 1, 1990, there is appropri-
ated to the entity created under Subsection 
11-13-5.5(4)"; substituted "l/64%" for "V32%" in 
two places in Subsection (4)(a)(i); and added 
Subsections i4)(a)(ii) and (4)(b)(i) and (ii). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 171, effective 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Amusement admissions. 
Construction. 
Definitions. 
Dental materials purchased by practitioners. 
Exemption from tax. 
Fractional sales. 
Fuel oil used by railroad. 
Industrial coal. 
Items furnished by motel to guests. 
Laundry service. 
Liability of consumer for tax. 
Municipally owned electric plants. 
Natural gas pipeline. 
Private clubs. 
I March 9, 1990, rewrote Subsection (4)(a)(i), 
which had read "the amount of sales and use 
tax generated by 1/64% of the tax levied under 
Subsection (2)(b) and 1/64% of the tax levied 
under Subsection (3)(b)" and Subsection 
<4)(a)(ii), which had read "the amount of reve-
nue generated by 1/64% of the local option tax 
as provided in Subsection 59-12-205(4)," and 
inserted "administrative, legal" in Subsection 
(4)(b)(ii). 
; The 1990 amendment by ch. 22, effective 
July 1, 1990, subdivided Subsection (1Mb); de-
leted "as defined by Section 54-2-1" after "tele-
i graph corporations" in paragraph of Subsection 
(1Kb); and added "intrastate" at the beginning 
i of Subsection UXbHii). 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
3 1991, inserted "Utah Sports Authority Act" in 
" Subsection (4)(a), and added Subsection 
1 (4)(a)(iii). 
The 1992 amendment, effective March 13, 
2 1992, substituted the reference to Title 9, 
1 Chapter 1, Part 3 for a reference to Title 62, 
Chapter 1 in Subsection (4)(a) and the refer-
i ence to § 9-1-303 for a reference to § 62-1-102 
i in Subsection (4XbXD. 
i Cross-References. — County or municipal 
sales and use tax, provisions of ordinance, 
 § 59-12-204. 
Purchase of coal. 
Purchase price. 
Railroad services. 
Rare and foreign coins. 
Repair sales. 
Sale in sister state. 
Sales of artificial limbs. 
Tourist accommodations and services. 
Transportation. 
Valuation of trade-ins. 
Vendor's duty to collect tax. 
Constitutionality. 
Subsections (l)(c) and (lXd) have been held 
to be constitutional against various conten-
tions. State Tax Comm. v. City of Logan, 88 
Utah 406. 54 P.2d 1197 (1936). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Sales and C.J.S. — 85 CJ.S. State and Local Taxation 
Use Taxes §§ 128 to 138, 230, 231. § 1245. 
Key Numbers. — Taxation «=» 1231 et seq. 
59-12-104. Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this 
chapter: 
(1) sales of motor fuels and special fuels subject to a Utah state excise 
tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax Act; 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions; 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines 
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or 
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 120% of the 
cost of items as goods consumed; 
(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, and re-
lated services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight consumption; 
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by com-
mon carriers in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio pro-
gram tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer, distrib-
utor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or commercial 
television or radio broadcaster; 
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines, coin-operated 
dry cleaning machines, or coin-operated car washes; 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the con-
duct of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities and, 
after July 1, 1993, if the requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are fulfilled; 
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the motor 
vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this 
state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state except as 
necessary to transport them to the borders of this state; 
(10) sales of medicine; 
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the con-
struction of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by Sec-
tions 19-2-123 through 19-2-127; 
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of 
this state; 
(13) sales of meals served by: 
(a) public elementary and secondary schools; 
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher ed-
ucation, if the meals are not available to the general public; and 
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities; 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in 
business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled or 
registered under the laws of this state; 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by 
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal 
operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and 
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equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, 
as determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah. 
Manufacturing facility means an establishment described in SIC Codes 
2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of 
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget. For purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule 
define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment/' By October 1, 
1991, and every five years thereafter, the commission shall review this 
exemption and make recommendations to the Revenue and Taxation In-
terim Committee concerning whether the exemption should be continued, 
modified, or repealed. In its report to the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee, the tax commission review shall include at least: 
(a) the cost of the exemption; 
(b) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and 
(c) the benefits of the exemption to the state; 
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and special 
test equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of any 
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States govern-
ment or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the terms 
of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment is 
vested in the United States government as evidenced by a government 
identification tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a 
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical; 
(17) intrastate movements of freight and express or street railway 
fares; 
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions; 
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full or 
part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of calculat-
ing sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins 
are limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon the then 
existing fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the vehicle being 
traded in, as determined by the commission; 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and weeds 
for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal 
products; 
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily 
and directly in farming operations, including sales of irrigation equip-
ment and supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether or 
not they become part of real estate and whether or not installed by 
farmer, contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of: 
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a man-
ner that is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit 
purchase price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial 
equipment and supplies; 
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than 
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and sup-
plies used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or in 
transportation; or 
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state, 
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put; 
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BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
HORNE CONSTRUCTION CORP., 
Petitioner, ) 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, 
v. ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDIT DIVISION OF THE ) 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, : Appeal No. 85 0118 
) 
Respondent• ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Commission for 
a Formal Hearing on May 27, 1987. The entire tax Commission 
was present with Roger 0. Tew conducting the proceedings, Mary 
Beth Walz, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of 
the Respondent. Gayle McKeachnie and Clark Alired appeared 
representing the Petitioner and Uintah School ristrict. 
After reviewing the evidence and arguments presentee 
at the Formal Hearing the Tax Commission makes its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1- Uintah County School District entered into two 
major construction projects in 1984-1985. One of these 
projects involved remodeling and constructing medicinal 
facilities on the West Junior High School. The other project 
involved the construction of the new Uintah High School 
together with the adjoining parking lot of the athletic fields. 
2. The Uintah School District undertook the 
responsibilities or the construction project itself. Rather 
than hire a prime contractor the school district acted as the 
prime contractor for both projects. To act as prime contractor 
the school district hired Dirk Harris to oversee the project. 
3. Mr. Harris was hired and given an office in the. 
school district's offices. He was designated to represent the 
school district in performing its duties as the prime 
contractor. The school district then entered into twenty-two 
separate contracts with various businesses for the construction 
of the Uintah High School and eight businesses for the work to 
be performed at the West Junior High School. 
3. The contracts included site preparation, 
mechanical, electrical, general construction, educational 
equipment, carpet, lockers, bleachers, library shelving, shop 
equipment, audirorium searing, state equipment, state lighting, 
gym flooring, athletic -rack, fencing, sprinkling system, Toro 
equipment, tennis courts, and stadium searing. 
4. One of the twenty-two contracts was let to Home 
Construction Company. Home Construction Company was to 
provide general construction on the main building and a few 
other items. 
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5« As part of the contract, the school district 
reserved the rights in all of its contracts to purchase the 
materials to be used in the construction of the two 
facilities• That provision provided "The owners (school 
district) shall have the right to furnish any part or all of 
the materials and equipment which shall become a part of the 
permanent structure•M 
6. If the school district elected to furnish the 
materials it would issue a purchase order to the vendor, the 
vendor would then deliver the materials to the job site. Upon 
delivery to the job site title to the materials would pass 
directly from the vendor to the school district. The school 
district had the responsibility of paying for the materials. 
7. The school district exercised its option on all of 
its contracts on the two projects to purchase and furnish 
materials. 
8. The school district secured lists and 
specifications through Dirk Karris from the various 
contractors. The school district then issued change orders ro 
the various contractors deleting the need to supply the 
materials and the cost of the materials from the contract. The 
school district then issued a purchase order directly to the 
vendor for the materials. 
9. The contracts with the various subcontractors then 
became labor only contracts. The vender supplied all neater!als 
to the construction site and title passed directly to the 
school district. Vendor then built a school district for the 
materials which paid for the materials by check issued directly 
from the school district. 
10. All vendors billed and receive payment from the 
school district and did not look for payment from the 
contractors. 
11. All warranties on the materials run to the school 
district and the school district was and is responsible for 
enforcing any and all warranties. 
12. School district provided insurance coverage for 
the materials after purchase and through construction of the 
building. 
13. School district was the owner of all surplus 
materials. 
14. School district inspected the materials when they 
arrived on the job site and then at times refused delivery of 
defective materials. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts, the 
Commission enter its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner did not purchase the materials used in 
the construction of the Uintah High School and therefore it is 
not liable for the Davment of sales tax on those materials. 
3. The materials used by the Petitioner in the 
construction of the Uintah High School were purchased and owned 
by the Uintah School District are exempt from sales tax. 
FINAL DECISION 
Therefore it is hereby decided that the sales tax 
assessment against the Petitioner, Home Construction 
Corporation, for the period of January 1, 1984 through April 
30, 1985 and the accompanying penalties and interest be 
rescinded. 
DATED this r^ffi day of Ylfri/^yrytJjJJ , 1987. 
BY ORDER OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
^ooe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: I; is hereby giver, that you have 20 cays from the 
date of nailing of this decision to appeal to the Tax Cour: 
or the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
JEH/hnrr./4 817w 
D 
ADDENDUM B 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ARCO ELECTRIC, ) 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on August 27, 28 and 29, 1991. G. Blaine 
Davis, Administrative Law Judge, Presiding Officer, heard the 
matter for and on behalf of the Commission. Joe B. Pacheco, 
Commissioner was present and heard the case on August 27, and 
28, 1991. S. Blaine Willes, Commissioner, was present and 
heard the case on August 28 and 29, 1991. Present and 
representing the Petitioner was Dudley Amoss, Attorney at Law. 
Present and representing Utah Transit Authority were Gayle F. 
McKeachnie, Attorney at Law, of the firm McKeachnie and Allred, 
and William D. Oswald, Attorney at Law. Present and 
representing the Granite School District was Thomas 
Christensen, Jr., Attorney at Law, of the firm Fabian and 
Clendenin. Present and representing the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints were Graham Dodd and Robert P. Lunt, 
Attorneys at Law, of the firm Kirton, McConkie and Poelman. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 87-1276 
Present and representing the Respondent was Clark Snelson, 
Assistant Utah Attorney General. 
This proceeding involves an audit which was performed 
by Respondent upon Petitioner for the years in question. The 
audit involved construction projects for three separate 
entities. Those projects were the Utah Transit Authority's 
facilities at its Northern Division at 135 West 17th Street, 
Ogden, Utah; Granite School District's Westbrook Elementary 
School at 6200 South 3500 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
Valley Crest Elementary School at 3100 South 5300 West, Salt 
Lake City, Utah; and the Printing Center for the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints at 1980 West Industrial 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
All of the construction projects were handled on 
different contracts, and were therefore legally 
distinguishable. The projects for each owner or exempt entity 
were therefore heard as separate proceedings on three different 
days. However, because there was just one* single audit 
performed on Petitioner, and because the audit was appealed as 
a single case number, all of those matters will be decided 
herein. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Facts Regarding Utah Transit Authority 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1, 1982 to 
March 31, 1987. 
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3. The 0ta& Transit Authority is a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, created under the Utah Public 
Transit District Act found at Utah Code Sec. 17A-2-1001 et. seq. 
4. The Utah Transit Authority entered into a 
contract directly with ARCO Electric on September 27, 1985. 
5. The contract between Utah Transit Authority and 
ARCO Electric contained a provision which required ARCO 
Electric to "furnish labor, supervision, equipment, supplies 
and materials" in connection with the construction of the Utah 
Transit Authority's facilities at its Northern Division. 
6. The low bid for materials and labor was 
$707,156.00. It was broken down as $427,400.00 for materials 
and $279,756.00 for labor. The original contract between the 
Utah Transit Authority and ARCO was $279,756.00. 
7. Because of changes to the original contract, the 
final payment to ARCO Electric was $294,762.78. These changes 
were to reflect additional work required of ARCO. 
8. The Utah Transit Authority hired Jacobsen 
Construction as the Construction manager at the site, with 
Kevin Brown, an employee of Jacobsen Construction, as its 
on-site Project Manager at the Ogden facility where- ARCO 
performed the work covered by the contract. 
9. Paragraph 5 on page 3 of the Construction 
Management contract between the Utah Transit Authority and 
Jacobsen Construction required that; 
"All tangible personal property used in the 
construction of the Northern Division Facility 
will be purchased by CM acting as agent of Owner 
it 
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10. Procurement* of^tCateriars£vfor^'the Ogden facility 
was initiated by the issuance of Utah Transit Authority 
purchase orders by Jacobsen Construction's project manager, 
Kevin Brown. 
11. Precontract bids obtained through public bidding 
determined where materials for the project would be obtained. 
12. Approximately twenty (20) open purchase orders 
were issued by Utah Transit Authority to individual vendors for 
the materials needed at the facility. 
13. The Utah Transit Authority arranged with each 
vendor to purchase the goods, ta have the goods delivered to 
Utah Transit Authority property, and used a Utah Transit 
Authority check to pay for the goods referencing the assigned 
purchase order number. 
14. Vendors then set up a customer file on the Utah 
Transit Authority Ogden facility, using one or more open 
purchase orders for all subsequent purchases. 
15. The terms of the purchase orders issued by the 
Utah Transit Authority to each vendor required the Utah Transit 
Authority to pay for materials and any freight charges either 
as part of the purchase price or as a separate item. 
16. The purchase order included the following 
language: 
UTAH SALES TAX DOES NOT APPLY 
Utah Transit Authority is exempt from 
all State Sales and use taxes under 
Sec, 11-20-55 of the laws of Utah and 
from Federal excise taxes under 
exemption No. 87-70-0023-K. 
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17. The contract between ARCO and the Utah Transit 
Authority contains language as follows: 
6.1 Sales and Use Tax: Contractor 
acknowledges that Authority is a 
public entity exempt from the payment 
of all Utah sales and use taxes and 
covenants and agrees that it will 
cooperate with Authority in helping 
Authority to legally avoid the Utah 
sales and use taxes on the project. 
18. The open purchase orders were very non-specific 
and did not specify the individual items of materials to be 
provided. When those items were billed, especially the items 
billed by General Electric Supply Company the invoices were 
billed to ARCO Electric and not to the Utah Transit Authority. 
Frequently the purchase orders were not issued until after the 
materials and invoices had already been received, and then 
Petitioner would send a letter to Jacobsen Construction (not 
the Utah Transit Authority) requesting that Jacobsen 
Construction issue a purchase order. The substance was that 
Jacobsen Construction was creating the paper trail for the Utah 
Transit Authority. (See Exhibits M, N, 0, P and Q). 
19. The Utah Transit Authority purchased insurance to 
cover any loss, due to fire or other loss or damage to materials 
purchased by the Utah Transit Authority. 
20. When damages occurred to property purchased by 
Utah Transit Authority on the project the Utah Transit 
Authority notified its insurance carrier of the claim, and 
obtained replacement materials from the suppliers. 
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21. ARCO Electric did not issue any purchase order 
for materials or make payment for materials included in the 
audit. 
22. Materials ordered under Utah Transit Authority 
purchase orders were delivered to the Ogden Utah Transit 
Authority site in Ogden, Utah, unless otherwise specified. 
23. Since 1979, the Utah Transit Authority has had on 
going communications with the staff of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, Auditing Division, with reference to its purchases 
of material for real property construction qualifying for the 
tax exempt status. 
24. On August 15, 1979, William D. Oswald, Legal 
Counsel for the Utah Transit Authority, met with Donald R. 
Bosch, Assistant Chief Auditor Utah State Tax Commission, and 
Joe Zvonek, his assistant, to review procedures which the Utah 
Transit Authority intended to follow. 
25. At that meeting, Mr. Bosch and Mr. Zvonek 
outlined for Mr. Oswald the Tax Commission's requirements for 
purchasing the materials for Utah Transit Authority projects to 
ensure that the purchases were tax exempt. 
26. Later, a question arose on the procedures- being 
used by the Utah Transit Authority on a contract with Allen 
Steel Company. Mr. Oswald met again with Don R. Bosch on 
February 2, 1982 to review the procedures. 
27. Mr. Oswald confirmed his understanding of what 
was said at the February 2, 1982 meeting with a letter dated 
February 9, 1982. Mr. Bosch did not respond to that letter and 
did not communicate or in any way indicate to Mr. Oswald that 
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his^  understanding as stated in: the letter was not correct* 
Facts Regarding Granite School District 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1, 1982 to 
March 31, 1987. 
3. Granite School District is a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah. 
4. Westbrook Elementary School and Valley Crest 
Elementary School were constructed pursuant to an agreement 
between the Granite Board of Education (owner) and Broderick & 
Howell Construction Company (the contractor) dated July 18, 
1984 (the ,,Agreement,,) . 
5. The contractor was selected by Granite as the 
general contractor after submission of bids by Broderick & 
Howell and other contractors for the construction of the two 
school buildings. 
6. The right of the owner to furnish materials and 
equipment used in the construction of the two school buildings 
is set forth in the Supplementary General Conditions which were 
made available to all general contractor and subcontractor 
bidders on the project prior to the actual bidding process, 
which provided, substantially as follows: 
a. The bid price submitted by the contractor included 
all labor, plant, materials, equipment, 
transportation, services and any other items required 
for construction and completion of the project. 
b. It was mandatory for the contractor and 
subcontractors to allow the owner to purchase directly 
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fronte suppl iers any part or \ * all of the materials and 
equipment which would become a part of the permanent 
structure. 
c. The contractor would negotiate, and administer all 
direct purchases by the owner and furnish to the owner 
a description, source of supply and other information 
necessary to enable the owner to purchase directly the 
materials and equipment. 
d. Purchases by the owner were to be made on 
requisition or purchase orders furnished by the owner 
and signed by the duly authorized purchasing agent of 
the owner. 
e. Title to all materials and equipment purchased by 
the owner was to pass from the vendor directly to the 
owner upon delivery to the job site without any 
vesting in the contractor. 
f. After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, theft, 
vandalism, or destruction of or to such materials and 
equipment purchased directly by the owner were to lie 
with the contractor. 
g. Storage of any materials and equipment furnished 
by the owner were to be the responsibility of the 
contractor. 
h. The contractor was required to hold the owner 
harmless of and from any failure of the materials or 
equipment purchased by the owner which resulted in any 
loss, claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in delivery or 
any problem relating to the materials or equipment. 
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i. The contractor was required to acknowledge receipt 
and approval of any materials or equipment purchased 
directly by the owner by signing the invoice for those 
materials or equipment. 
j. The owner was required to make payment for those 
materials and equipment within a reasonable time after 
the receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor, 
k. The owner was not responsible for the loss of any 
prompt payment discount from the purchase price if the 
owner made payment within ten business days following 
the receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor. 
1. The contract price was reduced by the amount 
actually paid by the owner for the materials and 
equipment purchased directly by the owner and by the 
sales tax which would have been paid on such materials 
and equipment had they been supplied by the 
contractor. Similarly, the amount of any progress 
payment was adjusted to reflect the direct purchase of 
any materials and equipment by the owner, 
m. The owner was not responsible for the loss or 
reduction of any trade discounts. Such loss or 
reduction of trade discounts would be charged to the 
contractor. 
n. All bonds and insurance called for in the 
Construction Agreement remained in full force. There 
was no reduction in the amount of coverage or any 
deduction for premiums for those bonds and insurance. 
o. The provisions for direct purchase by the owner of 
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materials and equipment did not relieve the contractor 
of any of its duties or obligations under the contract 
or constitute a waiver of any of the owner's rights. 
7. Arco Electric, the Petitioner in this matter was 
a subcontractor of Broderick & Howell Construction Company and 
performed electrical subcontract work pursuant to two separate 
Subcontract Agreements with Broderick & Howell, one for 
Westbrook Elementary and the second for Valley Crest 
Elementary, both dated August 6, 1984, Both Subcontract 
Agreements are identical. 
8. The General and Supplementary Conditions between 
Granite and Broderick and Howell were incorporated into the 
subcontract agreements between Petitioner and Broderick and 
Howell by reference. 
9. The subcontract agreements granted to the owner 
the right to furnish any part or all of the materials and 
equipment which would become part of the permanent structure of 
the school buildings. 
10. Pursuant to those provisions, the owner elected 
to furnish certain electrical materials and equipment 
incorporated into the elementary school building facilities by 
Petitioner pursuant to its agreement with Broderick & Howell. 
11. Materials and equipment incorporated into the 
elementary school facilities which were not furnished by the 
owner were furnished by Petitioner or Broderick & Howell and 
sales tax was paid on those materials. 
12. With respect to materials and equipment elected 
to be furnished by the owner, Broderick & Howell would prepare 
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and deliver to the owner a requisition form identifying 
materials and equipment and the suppliers of the materials and 
equipment. 
13. When the requisition form was received by the 
owner, a purchase order was then issued by the owner to the 
approved supplier of the materials and equipment identified in 
the requisition form. 
14. When the materials and equipment were delivered 
to the job site address, the supplier sent an invoice for the 
materials and equipment to the owner in care of the contractor 
for approval and payment. 
15. The authorized agent of the contractor would 
acknowledge receipt and approval of the materials and equipment 
identified in the invoice by signing the invoice and then 
forwarding it to the owner for payment. 
16. Once approved for payment, the invoice would then 
be paid by the owner to the supplier by check drawn on the 
operating account of the owner by the disbursing agent of the 
owner. 
17. After the owner had made payment for the 
materials and equipment, a change order to the original 
agreement with the contractor would then be executed giving the 
owner credit under the agreement for the cost of the materials 
and equipment plus the sales tax savings associated with the 
materials and equipment. 
18. M.H.T. Architects, Inc. ("M.H.T."), was employed 
by the owner to provide various professional services with 
-11-
respect to the construction of the two elementary school 
facilities, including the observation of installation and 
construction efforts, testing of material and approval of 
change orders. 
19. M.H.T. had no contractual relationship with the 
contractor or Petitioner. 
20. At all times during the installation and 
construction process the owner maintained a general liability 
insurance policy covering among other things, theft, vandalism 
and casualty losses from materials and equipment purchased by 
the owner and used in the construction of the elementary school 
facilities. 
21. the owner also maintained a fire and extended 
coverage insurance policy in the amount of the insurable value 
of the facilities. 
22. Lien waivers were secured by the contractor with 
respect to materials and equipment furnished by Petitioner or 
the contractor. 
23. Lien waivers were not secured by the contractor 
or Petitioner with respect to materials and equipment furnished 
by the owner. The owner's cancelled checks were accepted in 
place of lien waivers. 
24. Any excess materials were the property of the 
owner. 
Facts Regarding Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints Print Center 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
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2. The period in question is January l, 1982 to 
March 31, 1987. 
3. In 1986, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (The "Church" or "'Owner") entered into a contract with 
Interwest Construction Company ("Interwest") to construct a 
printing center (the "Print Center"). 
4. As part of the construction of the Print Center, 
Interwest subcontracted with the Petitioner, ARCO Electric 
("ARCO") to work on the electrical system required by the Print 
Center. 
5. Under its subcontract, ARCO was subject to the 
same general terms and conditions as the general contractor, 
Interwest. 
6. The general requirements of the contract with 
Interwest required the Petitioner to provide at its expense all 
materials, labor, equipment, tools, transportation and 
utilities, including the costs of connection necessary for the 
successful completion of the project. 
7. The contract also contemplated that some of the 
Print Center materials to be installed would be furnished by 
the owner. 
8. The contract required the Petitioner to install 
certain items furnished by the owner, and to receive and store 
in safe condition certain other items which were to be 
purchased directly by the owner. 
9. The contract provided for direct purchase of a 
waste collection system which would be delivered by the owner 
f.o.b. job site. Pursuant to the contract the Petitioner was 
to receive the equipment and be responsible for its protection 
and proper installation. After receipt of the equipment, the 
contractor's responsibilities were the same as if they had 
negotiated the purchase. 
10. The Church reserved the right in the contract to 
purchase materials to be used in the construction of the Print 
Center. Those purchases were handled as follows: 
a. The owner and the Petitioner would mutually 
agree which materials were to be purchased by the 
Owner. 
b. The cost of those materials, together with 
the amount the Petitioner would have paid as 
sales tax, were to be deducted from the contract 
sum as specified by change order, unless the 
materials were specifically deleted from the 
contract. 
c. Upon agreement between the owner and the 
Petitioner regarding the materials the owner was 
to purchase, the contractor would furnish the 
owner the necessary information, including source 
of supply, to enable the owner to purchase the 
materials. 
d. The Petitioner was required to hold the owner 
harmless of and from any failure of the supplies 
or materials so purchased resulting in any loss, 
claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in delivery, or 
any other problem relating to the materials, 
except where any failure was directly caused by 
acts or omissions of the owner. 
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e. All bonds and insurance called for in the 
contract were required to remain in full force. 
There was to be no reduction in the amount of 
coverage or any deduction for premiums for said 
bonds and insurance. 
f. Materials ordered by the owner were not to be 
paid for until written approval was given by the 
contractor. 
g. These conditions^ which applied to owner 
provided materials did not abrogate the 
Petitioner's responsibility to comply fully in 
the execution of the work as required by the 
contract documents. 
h. The Petitioner was required to receive all 
merchandise, inspect it, and be fully responsible 
to see that it met the specifications, and assure 
that its storage and installation gave the owner 
a completed product according to the intention of 
the contract. 
11. "Change Orders," were permitted by the contract. 
12. The Church employed Robert Haywood as its 
"Project Representative." (That term is defined in the General 
Conditions as: "That individual designated by the . . . owner 
as it's full time representative on the project during 
construction," 
13. The project representative was a full-time Church 
employee whose duties included insuring that the Print Center 
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materials in the possession of ARCO were handled in accordance 
with the contract. 
14. The contract required the Petitioner to receive 
and store any materials purchased under the owner purchase 
option. This obligation included providing sheds for the 
storage of any material subject to weather damage and securing 
the work and materials each night. 
15. The Church exercised its option to furnish Print 
Center materials in connection with the work of ARCO electric. 
16. The Church, through its project representative, 
secured material lists from ARCO and consulted with ARCO and 
Interwest regarding the materials ARCO needed to perform its 
work. 
17. A purchase order was then prepared by ARCO which 
was reviewed and approved by ARCO, Interwest, the project 
representative and Church Purchasing for accuracy and 
compliance with the contract terms. Thereafter, if everything 
was found to be proper, a purchase order was issued directly by 
the Purchasing Department of the Church to the appropriate 
vendor. 
18. With one exception, the vendors were instructed 
to send the Print Center materials to the Print Center. The 
Petitioner, and not the Church, had the responsibility to 
receive and inspect these materials. The Print Center 
materials were also inspected by the Church's project 
representative. 
19. In accordance with the instructions on the Church 
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purchase orders, the vendors billed the Church directly for the 
Print Center materials. 
20. The invoices were received and checked by the 
Church, then forwarded to ARCO, which verified the 
appropriateness of payment and then re-forwarded the invoices 
to Interwest for its verification and approval. 
21. Upon receiving the vendor's bill back from 
Interwest, with verification from the project representative 
that the Print Center materials appeared to be in conformance 
with the contract and purchase order, and written approval from 
the contractor, the Church made payment for the Print Center 
materials directly to the vendor. 
22. Title to the Print Center materials passed 
directly from the vendor to the Church. 
23. The vendors looked to the Church, not to ARCO or 
Interwest for payment. 
24. Change orders were issued crediting the owner for 
payments made to suppliers. 
25. Under this procedure suppliers were paid timely. 
The standard 10% contract retainage was not withheld on 
materials purchased by the Church. 
26. All warranties on the Print Center materials were 
obtained by the Petitioner in favor of the owner. 
27. The contract required the Church to provide a 
Builders Risk Policy insuring both ARCO and the Church which 
contained provisions to: 
a. Insure against all risk of direct physical 
loss of, or damage to, the property covered from 
any external cause. 
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b. All claims for loss or expense arising out of 
any one occurrence were to be adjusted as one 
claim, and from the amount of such adjusted claim, 
there was to be deducted the sura of $350.00 from 
loss resulting from the perils of fire, lightning, 
extended coverages and vandalism, and malicious 
mischief. There was also deducted the sum of 
$1,000.00 from any other covered peril. (The 
deductible amounts were the responsibility of the 
Contractor or subcontractor.) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Sales made to the state, its institutions, and 
its political subdivisions are exempt from sales and use 
taxes. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(2).) 
2. Sales made to or by religious or charitable 
institutions in the conduct of their regular religious or 
charitable functions and activities are exempt from sales and 
use taxes. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(8).) 
3. Sales of tangible personal property to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real property are subject 
to sales and use taxes. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
4. The person who converts personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property since he 
or she is the last person to own it as personal property. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 802 P. 2d 408 (Utah 1942); Olson Construction 
Company v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 
(Utah 1961); and Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). 
5. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or repair 
real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
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6. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors 
and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers, even if the contract is performed for a religious 
institution, charitable organization, or governmental 
instrumentality. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
7. Sales of materials to religious institutions, 
charitable organizations, and governmental instrumentalities 
are exempt only if sold as tangible personal property and the 
direct or indirect seller does not install the material as an 
improvement to realty or use it to repair real property. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). 
8« The contractor must accrue and report tax on all 
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to 
improve or repair real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
9. Rule R865-19-58S is the primary rule governing 
the sale of materials and supplies sold to owners, contractors 
and repairmen of real property, and it sets forth the 
requirements for the taxation of the sale or acquisition of 
tangible personal property which is to be used to improve, 
alter or repair real property. That rule provides in relevant 
part: 
k. Sale of tangible personal property 
to real property contractors and 
repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal 
property into real property is the 
consumer of the personal property since 
he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
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2. The contractor or repairman is the 
consumer of tangible personal property, 
used to improve, alter or repair real 
property; regardless of the type of 
contract entered into—whether it is a 
lump sum, time and material, or a 
cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not 
subject to the tax nor is the labor 
performed on real property. For 
example, the sale of a completed home or 
building is not subject to the tax, but 
sales of materials and supplies to 
contractors and subcontractors are 
taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers. This is true whether the 
contract is performed for an individual, 
a religious institution, or a 
governmental instrumentality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or 
charitable institutions and government 
agencies are exempt only if sold as 
tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the material as 
an improvement to realty or use it to 
repair real property. 
Petitioner has brought Rule R865-19-42S to the 
attention of the Commission, which rule provides: 
A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its 
departments and institutions or to its 
political subdivision such as counties, 
municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and 
metropolitan water districts are exempt from 
tax if such property [sic] for use in the 
exercise of an essential governmental 
function. If the sale is paid for by a 
warrant drawn upon the state treasurer or the 
official disbursing agent of any political 
subdivision, the sale is considered as being 
made to the state of Utah or its political 
subdivisions and exempt from tax. 
10." Sales of materials from a vendor to a contractor 
or other person or entity for use in the construction, 
improvement, alteration or repair of real property for a 
governmental entity, religious institution or charitable 
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organization is not exempt from sales and use tax. The 
incidents of the tax have been imposed on the contractor and 
not on the exempt entity. To be exempt, the sale must be from 
the vendor directly to the governmental entity, religious 
institution or charitable organization for the use of, and 
consumption by, the exempt entity. 
11. The fact that the burden of the tax may be passed 
by the contractor on to the exempt entity in the- form of higher 
prices and is thus paid indirectly by the exempt entity does 
not result in tax exemption for the transaction. (Rule 
R865-19-58S), Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), and Ford J. 
Tvaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 
343 (1944), Olsen Construction Company v. State Tax Commission, 
12 U.2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961). 
12. Parties seeking exemptions from the imposition of 
that tax bear the burden of proving that they qualify and are 
legally entitled to the exemption. Parson Asphalt Products v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (1980). 
13. In order for the sale to the exempt entity to be 
exempt from sales and use tax it must be a bona fide sale to 
the exempt entity acting either in the capacity as the final 
consumer of tangible personal property or the entity which 
converts the tangible personal property to real property. The 
sale is such a bona fide sale to an exempt entity only if 
either: 
a. The sale of materials or supplies is to the 
exempt entity and the exempt entity has its own 
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employees attach the materials-and7ors\ipplie^ to 
the realty, or 
b. The sale of materials and supplies is to the 
exempt entity, and the exempt entity separately 
hires a contractor to attach the materials and/or 
supplies to the realty on a labor only or install 
only contract, or 
c. The sale of materials and supplies is to an 
exempt entity which acts as the prime contractor 
by converting the tangible personal property to 
real property. 
14. The sale of tangible personal property is not 
exempt from sales and use tax if the exempt entity is simply 
acting as the purchasing agent for the general contractor. It 
is not merely whether the exempt entity engages in the 
mechanics of a purchase, but rather the legal status of the 
exempt entity at the time the purchase is made, i.e., is it 
purchasing the property as the final consumer of the tangible 
personal property. If the exempt entity makes the purchase for 
itself and its own use, consumption, or conversion to real 
property, the purchase is exempt from sales and use tax. On 
the other hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for 
another person or entity, or for use, consumption, or 
conversion to real property by another person or entity, the 
purchase is not exempt from sales and use tax because the 
exempt entity has only acted in the capacity of a purchasing 
agent for the final consumer which is the contractor. 
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15. If the exempt entity enters into a furnish and 
install contract with a general or subcontractor which requires 
the general or subcontractor to furnish and install the 
materials and supplies, then the exempt entity is not acting as 
the prime contractor as to the materials and supplies required 
by contract to be provided by the general or subcontractor. 
16. When the general or subcontractor is required by 
contract to provide materials and supplies and install them on 
real property, then the contractor is the consumer of that 
tangible personal property and is liable for the sales and use 
tax, even if an exempt entity goes through the mechanics of a 
purchase by issuing a purchase order and a check for payment. 
The contract is the controlling document, and determines who is 
the final consumer of tangible personal property, and thus the 
contract determines upon which party the incidence of taxation 
falls. Actions taken in noncompliance with the contract may be 
accepted without objection by the contractor and the exempt 
entity, but unless the contract is modified or changed by 
change order to show the consent of the contractor and the 
exempt entity to the modifications, the actions that are not in 
compliance with the contract do not shift or change the 
incidents of taxation. The written terms of the agreement will 
govern the taxability of the transaction and not the actions of 
the parties. This is especially so because written documents 
can be audited by State Tax Commission auditors, but actions, 
based on only after the fact statements, allegations or 
representations are impossible to audit. 
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17. For the exempt organization to be acting as the 
prime contractor, the exempt organization, by and through its 
own employees or agents must: 
a. Exercise direct supervision over the 
construction project. 
b. Issue purchase orders to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not 
paid. 
c. Make direct payment to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not 
paid. 
d0 Have provisions in any furnish and install 
contracts to permit changes through change orders 
to make that portion of the contract a labor only 
or install only contract, and those contractual 
provisions must be fully implemented and followed 
during the construction process. 
18. For the exempt organizations to act as the prime 
contractor exercising direct supervision over the construction 
project it is not necessary to act as the general contractor 
over the entire project. Instead, the exempt organization must 
exercise sufficient direct supervision over the purchased 
materials that there is a change in the legal status of which 
entity is responsible for those materials. Therefore, the 
exempt organization may be the prime contractor by exercising 
sufficient direct supervision over the purchased materials to 
be the prime contractor for a portion of the total contract. 
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The prime contractor or direct supervision requirement may 
apply to relationships within the full general contract. 
19. X$- be the prime contractor and exercise 
sufficient direct supervision, the exempt organization must 
assume the "burdens of risk" or the "incidents of risk." This 
requires evidence that the exempt organization has done more 
than just act as a "purchasing agent" for the general 
contractor. If a general contractor issues a purchase order on 
forms of the exempt entity and then later issues authorization 
for payment by check to the exempt entity, there has just been 
the creation of a "paper trail" and the direct supervision test 
has not been met. 
20. If the exempt organization and a general 
contractor enter into a furnish and install contract, the 
general contractor is contractually required to provide and 
install those materials. When the contractor provides and 
installs those materials the contractor is the final consumer 
of those materials and is required to pay sales or use tax on 
those materials (Rule R865-19-58S). For the exempt 
organization to purchase those materials and avoid sales or use 
tax, the furnish and install contract must contain a provision 
permitting change orders so the exempt organization may make 
such purchases, and the parties must then actually execute such 
change orders in advance of the purchases. The exempt 
organization, by its own employees or agents, must then issue 
purchase orders and vouchers or checks for payment, and must 
exercise direct supervision over the purchased materials. As 
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evidence regarding whether or not the exempt organization 
exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials, all 
of the relevant factors should be reviewed, including: 
a. Who assumed the burdens or incidents of risk? 
b. Who carried the risk of loss in the event of 
damage or destruction of the materials? 
c. Who, if anyone, carried and paid for 
insurance on the materials after delivery 
and prior to installation or attachment to 
the real property? 
d. Who physically inspected and counted the 
materials upon receipt? 
e. If there was a shortage in materials upon 
receipt, who was required to pay for 
additional materials? 
€. If there was an overage in materials upon 
receipt, who retained the surplus materials? 
q. If the materials did not meet specifications 
or quality standards, who had the right and 
authority to reject those materials? 
h. If materials were rejected for failure to 
meet quality standards or specifications, 
and it had resulted in a shutdown of the 
job, who would have been responsible for the 
shutdown expenses? 
i. Who was responsible for enforcing any 
warranties on the materials? 
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j. To whom did recourse go if the materials 
were faulty or defective? 
k. If materials failed after installation, who 
was responsible for any resulting damages 
including personal injuries? 
1. To whom did the title pass for the purchased 
materials? 
m. Were the bills submitted by the vendor 
directly to the exempt organization? 
n. Did the vendors look only to the exempt 
organization for payment of the bill? 
o. Did the general contractor or the 
subcontractor have to approve the bills 
before they were paid by the exempt 
organization? 
p. To whom were the materials delivered, i.e., 
to the contractor, the exempt organization 
or one of its employees or agents, or 
directly to the job site? 
21. Under a furnish and install contract, the 
contractor is required to furnish the materials and install 
those materials onto real property. Thus, the contractor is 
required to convert that tangible personal property into real 
property and the tax is imposed on that consumption of the 
tangible personal property by the contractor. Therefore, to 
avoid sales and use tax on materials used for a furnish and 
install contract, the contract must be modified through the 
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execution and implementation of change orders. When those 
change orders have been executed and implemented, the modified 
contract must make it clear that the materials in question have 
been separately purchased and provided by the exempt 
organization and that the contractor's only duty with respect 
to those materials is to provide the labor to install those 
materials. 
22. For the purchases of materials and supplies to be 
exempt from sales and use tax, the exempt entity must make the 
purchase and, title to the purchased items must pass to the 
exempt entity prior to the time it is attached to real 
property. The exempt entity must deal with the purchased items 
as its own property and treat those items the same as it would 
treat items it purchases for its own use and consumption. 
DECISION 
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of 
tangible personal property, but also upon "tangible personal 
property stored, used or consumed in this state." (U.C.A. 
59-12-103C1]) . In the construction business, when a person 
uses lumber, bricks, cement, steel, nails, and other materials 
to construct a building or other improvements to real estate, 
that person has used those ' materials and has converted the 
materials into real property. That conversion of tangible 
personal property into real property is deemed to be the 
consumption or use of the tangible personal property, which is 
the taxable event. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
sales and use tax is imposed upon the party that converts 
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tangible personal property into real property. Utah Concrete 
Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, supra, Olson 
Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra, and Tummurru 
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra. The party 
that makes that conversion from tangible personal property to 
real property has used or consumed that property, is the real 
property contractor, and is taxed on that property. If that 
conversion to real property is performed by anyone except an 
exempt entity, the use and consumption of the converted 
materials is subject to sales and use tax. If the conversion 
to real property is performed by an exempt entity acting as the 
real property contractor, the use and consumption of the 
converted materials is not subject to sales and use tax. 
Therefore, the primary issue in this case is to 
determine whether the Petitioner was the real property 
contractor or whether the Utah Transit Authority, Granite 
School District or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints (LDS Church) was the real property contractor. If a 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was the 
party that converted the tangible personal property into real 
property, then Petitioner was the real property contractor and 
is liable for the tax assessed by the Auditing Division. 
However, if a preponderance of the evidence indicates that Utah 
Transit Authority, Granite School District, or the LDS Church, 
or any of them converted the tangible personal property into 
real property then they would be the real property contractor 
and would be exempt from the sales and use tax. 
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To determine which party was the real property 
contractor, it is necessary to review and analyze the full 
scope of the contract and the legal rights, duties, 
obligations, and relationships of the parties with respect to 
the materials converted into real property. The primary 
evidence available to the Commission to make that determination 
is the contracts and agreements, together with all duly 
executed change orders and other written documents. Oral 
testimony is beneficial in interpreting the documents and 
gaining some insight into the conduct of the parties and, to 
some extent, their understanding of the requirements of the 
contract. However, where any inconsistencies may exist between 
the written contract, including executed change orders, and 
either the conduct or oral testimony of any person, the written 
contract is normally presumed to govern or prevail. 
Utah Transit Authority 
In the portion of this proceeding involving the Utah 
Transit Authority, a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
the legal rights, duties and obligations of Utah Transit 
Authority raised to the level of the real property contractor 
because Utah Transit Authority assumed many of the burdens, 
risks, responsibilities and incidents of ownership of the 
materials being converted to real property. Utah Transit 
Authority hired Jacobsen Construction as the Construction 
Manager of the project, not as the general contractor. The 
contracts with Petitioner, ARCO Electric, and most of the other 
contractors and subcontractors were entered into directly by 
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the Utah Transit Authority. That contract between Petitioner 
and the Utah Transit Authority was for labor only, 
notwithstanding that the contract did contain a provision which 
stated that ARCO was to furnish supplies and materials. 
However, it is clear that there was no money included in the 
contract for materials or supplies. The contract was not a 
furnish and install contract. The original contract was for 
$279,756,00, which was all for labor to install the materials 
supplied by the Utah Transit Authority. Therefore, Utah 
Transit Authority was the prime contractor on the project, and 
Jacobsen Construction was an agent of Utah Transit Authority as 
stated in the contract. Since Utah Transit Authority was the 
prime contractor on the project, they converted the materials 
into real property and the incidents of taxation would be 
imposed on the Utah Transit Authority if it were not an entity 
that is exempt from taxation. 
There are, however, three areas of concern. First, 
the invoices from General Electric were billed to ARCO Electric 
and not to Utah Transit Authority. Second, the contract did 
contain a provision requiring ARCO to provide the materials and 
supplies. Third, many of the purchase orders were not issued 
by Utah Transit Authority until after the materials and 
invoices had already been received. However, while these are 
areas of concern, there are reasonable explanations for each of 
them. The invoices from General Electric appears to be an 
error by General Electric. Invoices for materials from other 
companies were all billed directly to Utah Transit Authority. 
The provision in the contract for ARCO to provide materials and 
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supplies was not followed, and there was no money in the 
contract for materials or supplies and the issuance of 
purchase orders after the receipt of materials and invoices 
appears to be a shortfall caused by trust between the parties, 
and the time pressures of trying to get the job completed as 
rapidly as possible. In addition, because of the steps which 
were taken by Mr. Oswald, the attorney for Utah Transit 
Authority to try to assure compliance with the Tax Commission 
requirements, and the efforts of Utah Transit Authority to try 
to meet those requirements as they understood them, any doubts 
should be resolved in favor of the Utah Transit Authority. 
In viewing the totality of the Utah Transit Authority 
project, Utah Transit Authority was the prime contractor, the 
real property contractor, and the party that converted the 
materials into real property. Utah Transit Authority purchased 
the materials used on that project and assumed most of the 
risks, burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership. 
Those materials were not purchased by Petitioner, and 
Petitioner did not assume the burdens, risks, responsibilities 
and incidents of ownership. Furthermore, the contract was 
really a labor only contract. Therefore, sales and use taxes 
for the Utah Transit Authority project should not be imposed on 
Petitioner. 
In summary, it does appear that Utah Transit Authority 
assumed nearly all of the burdens, risks, responsibilities and 
incidents of ownership of those materials. Thus, a 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that Utah Transit 
Authority converted those materials from tangible personal 
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property into real property. Therefore, Utah Transit Authority 
was the real property contractor for those materials and 
pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was exempt from the use tax on 
those materials. 
Granite School District 
In the portion of this proceeding involving Granite 
School District, a preponderance of the evidence shows that the 
legal rights, duties and obligations of the school district did 
not rise to the level of the real property contractor because 
the school district did not assume the burdens, risks, 
responsibilities and incidents of ownership of the materials 
being converted to real property. Except for the paper work 
involved in the purchase order and the check for payment, the 
school district had only minimal involvement in the project, 
including the materials, during the construction process. The 
general contractor and the subcontractors had nearly total 
control of and responsibility for the materials during the 
construction process. 
There are numerous factors which show that Granite 
School District did not assume the burdens, risks, 
responsibilities and incidents of ownership. The price bid by 
Petitioner included all materials. The Petitioner negotiated 
and administered the direct purchases by the owner and 
furnished to the owner the source of supply and other 
information to enable the School District to purchase the 
materials. The risk of loss from damage, theft, vandalism or 
destruction of the materials was on the Petitioner after 
delivery of the materials. Storage of the materials was the 
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responsibility of Petitioner. The Petitioner was required to 
hold the owner harmless from any failure of the materials. The 
Petitioner was required to receive, inspect and sign for the 
materials upon delivery. The Petitioner could be held 
responsible for the loss of any prompt payment discounts or 
trade discounts, even though the School District was the party 
supposedly responsible for the payment. The construction bonds 
and insurance required from the Petitioner were not reduced to 
take away the responsibility for the materials purchased by the 
School District. The provisions for direct purchase by the 
School District did not relieve the Petitioner of any duties or 
obligations with respect to those materials. The invoices and 
requests for payment were made out in the name of the School 
District but were sent to the General Contractor for approval 
before the School District would make payment. The School 
District did not directly enter into the contract with 
Petitioner. Instead, Petitioner entered into its contract with 
the General Contractor. 
All of the above factors show that the risks of 
ownership were never assumed by the School District, and those 
risks continued to be assumed by Petitioner. The primary 
involvement of the School District was in the paper work, or 
the creation of a paper trail. Except for the creation of that 
paper trail, the School District had only minimal physical 
contacts with the materials. 
The school district did carry insurance on those 
materials, but the contractor was also required to carry 
insurance on those materials. The contractor and 
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subcontractors (including Petitioner) had all other burdens, 
risks, responsibilities and incidents of ownership on those 
materials. The Petitioner was contractually required to 
provide the materials for its portion of the project. 
Petitioner installed those materials onto the project, and 
acted as the owner of those materials by assuming the risks, 
burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership during the 
construction process. A preponderance of the evidence 
indicates that Petitioner converted those materials from 
tangible personal property into real property. Therefore, 
Petitioner was the real property contractor for those materials 
and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on 
those materials. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
Print Center 
In the portion of this proceeding involving the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Print Center, a 
preponderance of the evidence show that the legal rights, 
duties and obligations of the LDS Church did not rise to the 
level of the real property contractor because the LDS Church 
did not assume the burdens, risks, responsibilities and 
incidents of ownership of the materials being converted to real 
property. Except for the paper work involved in the purchase 
order and the check for payment, the LDS Church did not have 
substantial involvement in the project, or with the materials, 
during the construction process. The general contractor and 
the subcontractors had nearly total control of and 
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responsibility for the materials during the construction 
process. 
There are also numerous factors which show the LDS 
Church did not assume the burdens, risks, responsibilities and 
incidents of ownership. The Church did not directly enter into 
the contract with Petitioner. Instead, Petitioner entered into 
its contract with the General Contractor. The price bid by 
Petitioner included all materials. The Petitioner was required 
to provide to the Church all of the necessary information, 
including the vendor and pricing, of where to purchase the 
materials. The risk of loss was on the Petitioner, and 
Petitioner was required to hold the Church harmless for the 
supplies or materials and from any loss, claim, defect, 
discrepancy, delay in delivery, or any other problem related to 
the supplies or materials. The Petitioner was responsible for 
the receipt, inspection, approval, storage and safe keeping of 
the materials. The construction bonds and insurance required 
from the Petitioner were not reduced to take away the 
responsibility for the materials purchased by the Church. The 
provisions for direct purchase by the Church did not relieve 
the Petitioner from the responsibility to fully comply with the 
contract, including providing the materials. The original 
purchase orders were prepared by the Petitioner. The Church 
would not pay for the materials until the Petitioner had 
approved the invoices for payment. 
All of these factors show that the risks of ownership 
were never assumed by the Church, and those risks continued to 
be assumed by Petitioner. The primary involvement of the 
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Church was in the paper work, or the creation of a paper 
trail. Except for the creation of that paper trail, the Church 
had only minimal physical contacts with the materials. 
The Church did employ a full time project 
representative who was on the project site on a full time 
basis, and part of his duties related to the materials 
purchased by the Church. The purchase orders and checks for 
payment were issued by the Church, and the furnish and install 
contract did contain provisions for change orders and change 
orders were executed. 
However, the Commission must determine the case based 
upon a preponderance of the evidence. The Petitioner was 
contractually required to provide the materials for its portion 
of the project. Petitioner installed those materials onto the 
project, and acted as the owner of those materials by assuming 
the risks, burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership 
during the construction process. Therefore, a preponderance of 
the evidence indicates that Petitioner converted those 
materials from tangible personal property into real property. 
Therefore, Petitioner was the real property contractor for 
those materials and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for 
the use tax on those materials. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the order of the Utah 
State Tax Commission that the Petition for Redetermination for 
the Utah Transit Authority project is hereby granted, and the 
audit assessment made by the Auditing Division for that project 
is reversed and set aside. 
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The Petition for Redetermination for the Granite 
School District project and the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints Print Center project is hereby denied, and 
the audit assessment made by the Auditing Division on those two 
projects is affirmed. It is so ordered. 
DATED this /An day of ^^^^/^, 1992. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
(yjtj^i/juji/**. 
S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of^the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thi^i^?5^i^days 
after the date of final order to file in Sx^pf^^yJ^t^^ a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann, 
63-46b-14(2)(a) . u^f 
GBD/wj/2723w V * V * 
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DATED this Jff day of ~22faASL/- , 1992. 
Secretary 
-40 
ADDENDUM C 
SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-104 
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or other 
agricultural produce if sold by the producer; 
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps; 
(24) any container, label, shipping case, or, in the case of meat or meat 
products, any casing; 
(25) property stored in the state for resale; 
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her own 
personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property pur-
chased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at the 
time of purchase; 
(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of 
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or component part 
of a manufactured or compounded product: 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other 
state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any 
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and Part 
2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the tax 
imposed by this part and Part 2; 
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103(l)(b), (c), 
and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable under the 
subsections; 
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United 
States Department of Agriculture; 
(31) sales or leases made after July 1, 1987, and before June 30, 1994, 
of rolls, rollers, refractory brick, electric motors, and other replacement 
parts used in the furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill described in 
SIC Code 3312 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of 
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, but only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah facility pur-
chased and reopened for the production of steel; 
(32) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 73, 
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which 
are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not thereafter 
registered or used in this state except as necessary to transport them to 
the borders of this state: 
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state 
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated pursuant 
to contract into and becomes a part of real property located outside of this 
state, except to the extent that the other state or political entity imposes a 
sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it 
against which the other state or political entity allows a credit for taxes 
imposed by this chapter: 
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and use 
outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the title is 
passed in Utah: and 
<35) until July l. 1999. amounts paid for purchase of telephone service 
for purposes of providing telephone service. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, S 6: 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1: 1939, ch. 103, * 1; C. 1943, 
80-15-6; 1945, ch. 110, & 1; 1957, ch. 126, § 1; 
1957, ch. 127, 8 1; 1965, ch. 128, * 1; 1967, 
ch. 162. 5 1: 1969, ch. 187, § 3; 1969 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 14, * 3; 1973, ch. 42, * 9; 1973, ch. 
154. * 1; 1975, ch. 179, * 2; 1976, ch. 28, § 1; 
1979, ch. 195, 8 1; 1981, ch. 238, 8 1; 1981, 
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R865-19-42S. Sales to The State of Utah and Its 
Subdivisions Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 59-12-104. 
A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments 
and institutions or to its political subdivisions such as 
counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water 
districts are exempt from tax if such property for use 
in the exercise of an essential governmental function. 
If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn upon the 
state treasurer or the official disbursing agent of any 
political subdivision, the sale is considered as being 
made to the state of Utah or its political subdivisions 
and exempt from tax. 
R865-19-58S* Materials and Supplies Sold to 
Owners, Contractors and Repairmen of Real 
Property Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 
59-12-102 and 59-12-103. 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real prop-
erty contractors and repairmen of real property is 
generally subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property 
into real property is the consumer of the personal 
property since he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or 
repair real property; regardless of the type of contract 
entered into—whether it is a lump sum, time and 
material, or a cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax 
nor is the labor performed on real property. For ex-
ample, the sale of a completed home or building is not 
subject to the tax, but sales of materials and supplies 
to contractors and subcontractors are taxable trans-
actions as sales to final consumers. This is true 
whether the contract is performed for an individual, a 
religious institution, or a governmental instrumen-
tality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable in-
stitutions and government agencies are exempt only 
if sold as tangible personal property and the seller 
does not install the material as an improvement to 
realty or use it to repair real property. 
B. If the contractor or repairman purchases all ma-
terials and supplies from vendors who collect the 
Utah tax, no sales tax license is required unless the 
contractor makes direct sales of tangible personal 
property in addition to the work on real property. 
1. If direct sales are made, the contractor shall ob-
tain a sales tax license and collect tax on all sales of 
tangible personal property to final consumers. 
2. The contractor must accrue and report tax on all 
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing 
contracts to improve or repair real property. Books 
and records must be kept to account for both material 
sold and material consumed. 
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors 
for use in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless sold in 
interstate commerce in accordance with Rule 
R865-19-44S. 
D. This rule does not apply to contracts whereby 
the retailer sells and installs personal property which 
does not become part of the real property. See Rules 
R865-19-51S, R865-19-59S, and R865-19-78S for in-
ADDENDUM D 
p\ UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
V^ihriir 'iy 160 East ^^ South 
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Telephone (801) 530-6077 
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Roger O. Tew, Commissioner 
T u n * i n 4AAA foe B. Pacheco, Commissioner 
sjunm 1 J ; A * * g G. Blaine Davts, Commissioner 
TO: All Petitioners Where The Issue Is Sales Tax On Construction 
Projects For Exempt Organizations. 
The State Tax Commission issued a decision following a formal 
hearing in the matter of Home Construction Corp, v. Audit Division 
of the State Tax Commission of Utah, Appeal No. 85-0118. This case 
involved sales tax on a construction project for a tax exempt 
organization. The decision was issued on November 25, 1987. 
Since that time, there have been numerous questions raised 
regarding the interpretation of that decision and its impact on the 
other pending cases with a similar issue. 
That decision contained several factors which made the 
conclusion inescapable that the transactions were not subject to 
sales and use tax. It is the understanding of the Commission that 
many of the pending cases do not contain all of the factors listed 
in the "Home" decision, so legal counsel for several of the 
Petitioners have asked for further clarification and interpretation 
regarding which factors were controlling in that case. 
Therefore, without attempting to pre-judge any of the pending 
cases, the Commission provides to the parties its interpretation of 
the "Home" decision. 
Section 59-12-104, U.C.A., provides in relevant part: 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed 
by this chapter: 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its 
political subdivisions; . . . . 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions 
in the conduct of their regular religious or charitable 
functions and activities; 
Rule R865-19-58S provides in relevant part: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
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3. . . . sales of materials and supplies to contractors and 
subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers. This is true whether the contract is performed for 
an individual, a religious institution, or governmental 
instrumentality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable institutions 
and government agencies are exempt only if sold as tangible 
personal property and the seller does not install the material 
as an improvement to realty or use it to repair real property. 
In the "Home" case, although Home Construction was the major 
subcontractor for the exempt organization, it was held that the 
company was not liable for the sales and use tax because the exempt 
organization acted as the prime contractor and purchased their own 
materials and supplies. Those purchases by the exempt organization 
were not taxable. The key to that decision was that the exempt 
organization was acting as the contractor. 
The next issue would be whether it would be necessary for all 
of the factors from the "Home" case to be present for the 
Commission to deem other exempt organizations to also be acting as 
the contractor? The Commission is of the opinion that for an 
exempt organization to be actinq as the contractor it must meet the 
following minimum criteria; 
1. The exempt organization must exercise direct supervision 
over the construction project. 
2. Purchase orders must be issued by the exempt organization 
for all materials for which sales tax is not paid. 
3. Payment must be made by the exempt organization for all 
materials for which sales tax is not paid. 
4. Any furnish and install contracts entered into must have 
provisions in the contract for changes through change orders. 
The Commission desires to conclude the pending cases on this 
issue as rapidly as possible, either by stipulation between the 
parties or by appropriate hearings before the Commission. The 
Commission is well aware that there has been substantial delay in 
this matter which was not the fault of the Petitioners, and that 
penalties may have been imposed in matters where it was not clear 
that taxes were due on the transactions. Therefore, the Commission 
will waive all penalties and interest in these cases until 30 days 
after the date of this letter; i.e., no interest will be charged on 
any of the cases until 30 day after the date of this letter. 
June 13, 1990 
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The Commission is scheduling a prehearing conference to inform 
the parties of these standards, to explore the possibility of 
consolidating the cases that are going forward to hearing, and to 
discuss any further procedural aspects of the cases. The pre-
hearing conference will be scheduled at the same time for all 
petitioners in cases where it is known to the Commission that the 
issue is sales tax on construction projects for exempt 
organizations. It is not to discuss whether the Commission should 
have adopted some other interpretation of the "Home" decision, 
whether particular fact situations comply with the above 
interpretation, or to discuss specific cases. Instead, it is 
intended to assist the parties in understanding the Commission's 
interpretation of the "Home" decision. 
y 
This letter and a Notice of Prehearing Conference are being 
sent to all of the parties in cases where it is known that the 
issue in the case is sales and use tax on construction projects for 
tax exempt organizations. Because of limited space available for 
the hearing, it is requested that only one attorney or one other 
representative of each petitioner attend the ocfihearing conference. 
Roger 0. Tew 
Commissioner 
Joe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
6. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
ADDENDUM E 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
Petitioner, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
V. ) AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Appeal No. 86-0650 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on June 13, 1991. Roger 0. Tew, 
Commissioner, served as the Presiding Officer. In addition, R. 
H. Hansen, Chairman, Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner, G. Blaine 
Davis, Commissioner, and Paul F. Iwasaki, Administrative Law 
Judge, heard the matter for and on behalf of the Commission. 
Present and representing the Petitioner were Bruce L. Olson, 
and Gerald T. Snow, Attorneys at Law, of Ray, Quinney and 
Nebeker, Eugene H. Bramhall, General counsel of Brigham Young 
University, and H. Hal Visick, Associate General Counsel of 
Brigham Young University. Present and representing the 
Respondent was Clark L. Snelson, Assistant Utah Attorney 
General. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1, 1982 to 
December 31, 1984. 
3. Between January 1982 and December 1984, 
Petitioner was the general contractor for two projects on the 
campus of Brigham Young University (BYU) in Provo, Utah. Those 
two projects were the expansion of the BYU football stadium and 
the construction of the Technology Building. 
4. BYU (the owner) is a religious and educational 
institution owned and operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints (LDS Church). 
5. Prior to entering into contracts, BYU solicited 
potential bidders through its prequalification process, and 
requested that they submit furnish and install bids for each of 
the projects. Each of the submitted bids was required to 
contain a list of the materials to be used and the name of the 
supplier whose bid had been included in the final submitted bid. 
6. BYU reserved the right to accept or reject any 
subcontractor or supplier listed by the general contractor in 
its bid and accept the next lowest subcontractor or supplier in 
the bid by paying the additional charges for the next lowest 
subcontractor or supplier. 
7. BYU also reserved the right to purchase certain 
materials and furnish them to the general contractor by 
compliance with Section 75 of the contract conditions, which 
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provided that if BYU wanted to purchase a portion of the 
materials it would be handled as follows: 
a. The owner and the contractor were required to 
mutually agree which materials the owner would purchase. 
b. The cost of such materials, together with the 
amount the contractor would have paid as sales tax, would be 
deducted from the contract sum. 
c. Upon agreement between the owner and the 
contractor as to which materials the owner was to purchase, the 
contractor was required to furnish to the owner all necessary 
information, including source of supply, to enable the owner to 
properly purchase such materials. 
d. Contractor was required to hold the owner harmless 
from any failure of the supplies or materials so purchased if 
such failure resulted in any loss, claim, defect, discrepancy, 
delay in delivery or any other problem relating to the 
materials, except where the failure was directly caused by acts 
or omissions of the owner. 
e. All bonds and insurance, required by the contract, 
had to remain in full force. There was no reduction in amount 
of coverage or any deduction for premiums for said bonds and 
insurance. 
f. Materials ordered by the owner were not paid for 
until written approval had been given by the contractor. 
g. The above conditions did not abrogate the 
contractor's responsibility to comply fully in the execution of 
the work as required by the contract. 
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8. Sections 22 and 75 of the contract conditions 
specifically permitted BYU to purchase materials and deduct the 
cost of such materials, plus the sales tax, by change orders 
from the contracts. However, even though the parties conducted 
their business as though the change orders were made, some of 
the change orders were never made by the parties. Thus, the 
parties were sometimes acting contrary to the contract, but the 
testimony represented that this was agreeable to both parties. 
9. The contract provided that the general contractor 
was not the agent of BYU, but BYU could appoint the general 
contractor as the agent for BYU for such purposes as were 
decided by BYU and were agreeable to the general contractor. 
However, there is no evidence that BYU ever appointed the 
general contractor as its agent for any purpose. 
10. The contract required BYU to appoint an "Owners 
Representative," to have supervisory responsibilities for the 
project. Fred A. Schwendiman, Director of BYU's Physical Plant 
Department was designated as the owners representative. .Mr. 
Schwendiman was not on the projects on a day-to-day basis, but 
was represented by the manager of the Construction Section of 
the Physical Plant, Aldo C. Nelson, and one or more 
Construction Inspectors with the Construction Section. 
11. The term "Owners Representative" was interpreted 
by BYU and Petitioner to mean Mr. Schwendiman, or the manager 
of the Construction Section of the Physical Plant Department, 
or any of the construction inspectors when they were on the job 
site. Pursuant to the contract, the owners representative had 
numerous responsibilities, including: 
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a. General supervision and direction of the work. He 
was the agent of the owner on the site. 
b. Enforcing the performance of the contract, but not 
permitting any changes in the conditions of the contract. 
c. Giving all instructions, directions, or other 
information to the contractor or his authorized agent. 
d. The authority to stop the work whenever such 
stoppage was necessary to insure the proper execution of the 
contract. This included the stoppage of any work that was 
being improperly performed or using unacceptable materials, and 
he could demand that any incompetent workman be taken off the 
job and another person substituted. 
e. To serve as interpreter of the conditions of the 
contract subject to the review of his decision or 
interpretations by the architect. 
f. To serve as judge of the performance of the 
contract with power to enforce faithful performance subject to 
a review of his decision or interpretation by the architect. 
g. To approve or reject the construction 
superintendent hired by the general contractor. 
h. To approve the monthly progress estimate which was 
used as a basis for monthly progress payments to subcontractors. 
i. Inspect and accept the finished project, 
j. To approve or reject any proposed changes in the 
plans and specifications. 
k. To withhold payment from the general contractor 
upon certain conditions. 
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12. The Manager of the Construction Section, Mr. Aldo 
C. Nelson, had the responsibility to coordinate, inspect and 
supervise all construction projects on the BYU Campus on behalf 
of the Director of Physical Plant, Fred A. Schwendiman. Mr. 
Nelson supervised a staff of inspectors who supervised on a 
daily basis all construction projects on the BYU Campus. Mr. 
Finn Murdoch was the inspector of both of the projects at issue 
in this proceeding. 
13. The general contractor and subcontractors were 
responsible to furnish all materials provided in the 
specifications, other than those which BYU opted to purchase 
through change orders. The General contractor and 
subcontractors were required to pay sales taxes on all 
materials with the exception of those purchased by BYU pursuant 
to change order. 
14c BYU excluded some materials for the projects from 
the contract. Petitioner was not required by the contract to 
purchase these materials. BYU purchased these materials 
directly, without using change orders or deducting the price of 
the materials and sales tax from the contract amounts. BYU did 
not pay sales tax on these items. 
15. As to materials purchased for the projects by 
BYU, which Petitioner was required by the original contract to 
purchase, the following steps generally were taken by BYU, with 
the assistance of the general contractor: 
a. BYU developed and printed a special purchase 
order form, called a "Z" purchase order. 
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b. BYU delegated the responsibility for 
preparing Z purchase orders to the general contractor, who in 
turn sometimes delegated that responsibility to the 
subcontractor. The Z purchase order identified the item(s) for 
purchase, quantity, supplier (from the bid documents) and other 
data. Each Z purchase order also showed that BYU was the 
ordering and purchasing party and that the materials should be 
delivered to the construction project on the BYU campus. In the 
case of steel for the stadium expansion, the Z purchase orders 
reflected that invoices should be sent to BYU, in care of the 
subcontractor, Allen Steel Company, and that the steel should 
be delivered to Allen's yard in Salt Lake City, in the name of 
the Cougar Stadium Project, in order to perform fabrication on 
the steel prior to delivery to the BYU campus. 
c. After being filled in by the general 
contractor and/or subcontractor, the Z purchase order was 
reviewed by BYU Construction Section officials and logged in on 
a master list. 
d. BYU seldom objected to the manner in which 
the general contractor completed Z purchase orders or the 
suppliers listed in bid documents, due to communication between 
BYU and the general contractor, the information provided by BYU 
and the general contractor at the bid stage, and the trust BYU 
and the general contractor have developed over many years. 
e. After being reviewed by the BYU Construction 
Section, the Z purchase order was then sent to the BYU 
Purchasing Department, which in turn submitted it to the 
supplier for processing. 
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f. Generally, materials were shipped to the 
campus construction sites, where they were received and 
inspected for quantity and quality by the general contractor 
and/or subcontractors. In most cases, BYU Construction Section 
personnel also inspected the materials at the same time. In 
some cases, such as with the BYU-purchased steel on the stadium 
expansion, the materials were first delivered to a location 
other than to the BYU campus and were inspected by BYU 
personnel there. 
g. Steel for the stadium expansion was 
delivered to the yard of Allen Steel Company, the steel 
subcontractor, for further fabrication. BYU arranged for U.S. 
Steel Corporation and its Geneva Works to test the manufactured 
steel and provide written reports to BYU as to the test 
results. BYU also hired Pittsburg Testing Laboratory, a 
professional consulting firm, to analyze and test the steel at 
BYU's expense over a period of many months. The consultants 
checked, both manually and through ultrasonic and x-ray 
devices, welds, fabrication, length, thickness, compliance with 
drawings, painting and bolt torque. During peak periods of 
steel delivery, the consultants had teams working 24 hours per 
day. The consultant rejected some of the fabricated steel, and 
BYU then required the manufacturer, its agents and/or the 
subcontractor to remedy all defects or problems discovered with 
the steel. 
h. The contract did require the general 
contractor to be responsible to resolve problems with the 
suppliers of materials purchased through Z purchase orders, 
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such as delays, damage in transit, and poor handling, but BYU 
did take care of most of the problems that occurred. 
i. The general contractor inspected and 
accounted for the materials at the construction site to ensure 
that materials were not wasted and that completion of the 
overall project was not delayed. 
j. Once materials were received, a bill was 
delivered to BYU. Upon receiving word from Nelson or Murdoch 
and from the general contractor that the correct quantity and 
quality of materials had been received, the BYU Purchasing 
Department paid the bill with a BYU check. 
k. If BYU overpaid a vendor (e.g., due to an 
accounting error), it was BYU's responsibility to correct the 
error and obtain a refund. BYU did not receive a credit 
against the contract bid for the overpayment. 
1; Because of their significant buying power, 
the LDS Church and/or BYU were able to obtain discounts upon 
purchasing certain supplies and materials. Any price discounts 
given to BYU when purchasing materials were kept by BYU and not 
passed on to the general contractor. 
16. The cost (as reflected in the bid) of the 
materials purchased through Z purchase orders, in addition to 
the amount of sales tax attributable thereto, was to be 
deducted from the contract bid by change orders. However, 
while the parties executed some change orders, such change 
orders were not executed for all materials purchased by BYU. 
BYU and Petitioner both testified that they did not feel that 
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change orders were always necessary because of their long 
history of dealing with each other. 
17. On materials purchased through Z purchase orders, 
BYU paid 100% of the purchase price of materials, once the 
materials were inspected and found to be in order. However, 
BYU paid only 90% of the purchase price of materials purchased 
by the general contractor, holding back a 10% retainage. This 
retainage largely comprised the general contractor's profit and 
provided a safety net for BYU that the general contractor would 
fully perform on the contract. With respect to materials paid 
for by BYU, the 10% retainage was not available to BYU. 
18. BYU sent release forms to suppliers who sold 
materials to BYU, to ensure that no further claim would be made 
against Z purchase orders. 
19. If a subcontractor failed to pay a supplier, the 
general contractor bore the risk of liens on the project 
through the 10% contract retainage. The general contractor did 
not bear this risk with respect to the materials purchased and 
paid for by BYU, 
20. BYU relied upon the general contractor to ensure 
that BYU-purchased materials were not lost, misplaced or 
damaged after arrival at the construction sites and prior to 
installation by the general contractor or subcontractors. BYU 
also took an active part in providing security for 
BYU-purchased materials by providing general security for the 
construction sites through its Security Police officials, and 
also provided fencing materials to the general contractor, 
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which were installed around all construction materials and 
equipment located at the Projects. 
21. BYU was required to and did provide a Builder's 
Risk Insurance Policy for each of the projects. That coverage 
was furnished and paid for by the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints. This insurance policy covered the materials 
for all physical losses and damage from the time of arrival at 
the construction sites through installation of the materials. 
22. The risk of damage or loss of materials purchased 
by BYU was the responsibility of BYU or its insurer, until 
delivery was made to the job sites. The risk of loss for 
materials purchased by BYU after the materials arrived at the 
job sites was covered by the Builder's Risk Insurance Policy. 
BYU further relied upon the Petitioner to prevent loss, damage 
or theft of BYU-purchased materials. 
23. Suppliers looked to BYU for payment, and it was 
BYU who paid them, promptly and in full, assuming the suppliers 
delivered the materials as and when requested. 
24. Warranty Certificates provided by vendors were 
made in the name of BYU and not in the name of the general 
contractor or subcontractors. 
25. There have been no claims made against suppliers 
of materials pursuant to warranties on those materials because 
there have been no failures of the materials. BYU was the 
owner of surplus materials which remained following completion 
of the projects. BYU takes possession and uses excess 
materials it has purchased after all construction projects on 
its campus. No materials purchased by BYU for the projects 
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were retained by the general contractor or subcontractors 
following completion of the projects. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Sales made to the state, its institutions, and 
its political subdivisions are exempt from sales and use 
taxes. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(2).) 
2. Sales made to or by religious or charitable 
institutions in the conduct of their regular religious or 
charitable functions and activities are exempt from sales and 
use taxes. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(8).) 
3. Sales of tangible personal property to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real property are subject 
to sales and use taxes. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
4. The person who converts personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property since he 
or she is the last person to own it as personal property. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 802 P.2d 408 (Utah 1942); Olson Construction 
Company v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 
(Utah 1961); and Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). 
5. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or repair 
real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
6. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors 
and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers, even if the contract is performed for a religious 
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institution, charitable organization, or governmental 
instrumentality. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
7. Sales of materials to religious institutions, 
charitable organizations, and governmental instrumentalities 
are exempt only if sold as tangible personal property and the 
direct or indirect seller does not install the material as an 
improvement to realty or use it to repair real property. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). 
8. The contractor must accrue and report tax on all 
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to 
improve or repair real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
9. Rule R865-19-58S is the primary rule governing 
the sale of materials and supplies sold to owners, contractors 
and repairmen of real property, and it sets forth the 
requirements for the taxation of the sale or acquisition of 
tangible personal property which is to be used to improve, 
alter or repair real property. That rule provides in relevant 
part: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property 
to real property contractors and 
repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal 
property into real property is the 
consumer of the personal property since 
he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the 
consumer of tangible personal property 
used to improve, alter or repair real 
property; regardless of the type of 
contract entered into—whether it is a 
lump sum, time and material, or a 
cost-plus contract. 
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3. The sale of real property is not 
subject to the tax nor is the labor 
performed on real property. For 
example, the sale of a completed home or 
building is not subject to the tax, but 
sales of materials and supplies to 
contractors and subcontractors are 
taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers. This is true whether the 
contract is performed for an individual, 
a religious institution, or a 
governmental instrumentality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or 
charitable institutions and government 
agencies are exempt only if sold as 
tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the material as 
an improvement to realty or use it to 
repair real property. 
10. Sales of materials from a vendor to a contractor or 
other person or entity for use in the construction, 
improvement, alteration or repair of real property for a 
governmental entity, religious institution or charitable 
organization is not exempt from sales and use tax. The 
incidents of the tax have been imposed on the contractor and 
not on the exempt entity. To be exempt, the sale must be from 
the vendor directly to the governmental entity, religious 
institution or charitable organization for the use of, and 
consumption by, the exempt entity. 
11. The fact that the burden of the tax may be passed by 
the contractor on to the exempt entity in the form of higher 
prices and is thus paid indirectly by the exempt entity does 
not result in tax exemption for the transaction. (Rule 
R865-19-58S), Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), and Ford J. 
Twaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 
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343 (1944), Olsen Construction Company v. State Tax Commission, 
12 U.2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961). 
12- Parties seeking exemptions from the imposition of that 
tax bear the burden of proving that they qualify and are 
legally entitled to the exemption. Parson Asphalt Products v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (1980). 
13. In order for the sale to the exempt entity to be 
exempt from sales and use tax it must be a bona fide sale to 
the exempt entity acting either in the capacity as the final 
consumer of tangible personal property or the entity which 
converts the tangible personal property to real property. The 
sale is such a bona fide sale to an exempt entity only if 
either: 
a. The sale of materials or supplies is to the exempt 
entity and the exempt entity has its own employees 
attach the materials and/or supplies to the realty, or 
b. The sale of materials and supplies is to the 
exempt entity, and the exempt entity separately hires 
a contractor to attach the materials and/or supplies 
to the realty on a labor only or install only 
contract, or 
c. The sale of materials and supplies is to an exempt 
entity which acts as the prime contractor by 
converting the tangible personal property to real 
property. 
14. The sale of tangible personal property is not exempt 
from sales and use tax if the exempt entity is simply acting as 
the purchasing agent for the general contractor. It is not 
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merely whether the exempt entity engages in the mechanics of a 
purchase, but rather the legal status of the exempt entity at 
the time the purchase is made, i.e., is it purchasing the 
property as the final consumer of the tangible personal 
property. If the exempt entity makes the purchase for itself 
and its own use, consumption, or conversion to real property, 
the purchase is exempt from sales and use tax. On the other 
hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for another 
person or entity, or for use, consumption, or conversion to 
real property by another person or entity, the purchase is not 
exempt from sales and use tax because the exempt entity has 
only acted in the capacity of a purchasing agent for the final 
consumer, which is the contractor. 
15. If the exempt entity enters into a furnish and install 
contract with a general or subcontractor which requires the 
general or subcontractor to furnish and install the materials 
and supplies, then the exempt entity is not acting as the prime 
contractor as to the materials and supplies required by 
contract to be provided by the general or subcontractor. 
16. When the general or subcontractor is required by 
contract to provide materials and supplies and install them on 
real property, then the contractor is the consumer of that 
tangible personal property and is liable for the sales and use 
tax, even if an exempt entity goes through the mechanics of a 
purchase by issuing a purchase order and a check for payment. 
The contract is the controlling document, and determines who is 
the final consumer of tangible personal property, and thus the 
contract determines upon which party the incidence of taxation 
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falls. Actions taken in noncompliance with the contract may be 
accepted without objection by the contractor and the exempt 
entity, but unless the contract is modified or changed by 
change order to show the consent of the contractor and the 
exempt entity to the modifications, the actions that are not in 
compliance with the contract do not shift or change the 
incidents of taxation. The written terms of the agreement will 
govern the taxability of the transaction and not the actions of 
the parties. This is especially so because written documents 
can be audited by State Tax Commission auditors, but actions, 
based on only after the fact statements, allegations or 
representations are impossible to audit. 
17. For the exempt organization to be acting as the prime 
contractor, the exempt organization, by and through its own 
employees or agents must: 
a. Exercise direct supervision over the construction 
project. 
b. Issue purchase orders to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not paid. 
c. Make direct payment to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not paid. 
d. Have provisions in any furnish and install 
contracts to permit changes through change orders to 
make that portion of the contract a labor only or 
install only contract, and those contractual 
provisions must be fully implemented and followed 
during the construction process. 
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18. For the exempt organizations to act as the prime 
contractor exercising direct supervision over the construction 
project it is not necessary to act as the general contractor 
over the entire project. Instead, the exempt organization must 
exercise sufficient direct supervision over the purchased 
materials that there is a change in the legal status of which 
entity is responsible for those materials. Therefore, the 
exempt organization may be the prime contractor by exercising 
sufficient direct supervision over the purchased materials to 
be the prime contractor for a portion of the total contract. 
The prime contractor or direct supervision requirement may 
aPPly to relationships within the full general contract. 
19. To be the prime contractor and exercise sufficient 
direct supervision, the exempt organization must assume the 
"burdens of risk" or the "incidents of risk." This requires 
evidence that the exempt organization has done more than just 
act as a "purchasing agent" for the general contractor. If a 
general contractor issues a purchase order on forms of the 
exempt entity and then later issues authorization for payment 
by check to the exempt entity, that action would be considered 
as the creation of a "paper trail" and the direct supervision 
test has not been met. 
20. If the exempt organization and a general contractor 
enter into a furnish and install contract, the general 
contractor is contractually required to provide and install 
those materials. When the contractor provides and installs 
those materials the contractor is the final consumer of those 
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materials and is required to pay sales or use tax on those 
materials (Rule R865-19-58S). For the exempt organization to 
purchase those materials and avoid sales or use tax, the 
furnish and install contract must contain a provision 
permitting change orders so the exempt organization may make 
such purchases, and the parties must then actually execute such 
change orders in advance of the purchases. The exempt 
organization, by its own employees or agents, must then issue 
purchase orders and vouchers or checks for payment, and must 
exercise direct supervision over the purchased materials. As 
evidence regarding whether or not the exempt organization 
exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials, all 
of the relevant factors should be reviewed, including: 
a. Who assumed the burdens or incidents of risk? 
b. Who carried the risk of loss in the event of 
damage or destruction of the materials? 
c. Who, if anyone, carried and paid for insurance on 
the materials after delivery and prior to 
installation or attachment to the real property? 
d. Who physically inspected and counted the 
materials upon receipt? 
e. If there was a shortage in materials upon 
receipt, who was required to pay for additional 
materials? 
f. If there was an overage in materials upon 
receipt, who retained the surplus materials? 
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If the materials did not meet specifications or 
quality standards, who had the right and 
authority to reject those materials? 
If materials were rejected for failure to meet 
quality standards or specifications, and it had 
resulted in a shutdown of the job, who would have 
been responsible for the shutdown expenses? 
Who was responsible for enforcing any warranties 
on the materials? 
To whom did recourse go if the materials were 
faulty or defective? 
If materials failed after installation, who was 
responsible for any resulting damages including 
personal injuries? 
To whom did the title pass for the purchased 
materials? 
Were the bills submitted by the vendor directly 
to the exempt organization? 
Did the vendors look only to the exempt 
organization for payment of the bill? 
Did the general contractor or the subcontractor 
have to approve the bills before they were paid 
by the exempt organization? 
To whom were the materials delivered, i.e., to 
the contractor, the exempt organization or one of 
its employees or agents, or directly to the job 
site? 
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21. Under a furnish and install contract, the contractor 
is required to furnish the materials and install those 
materials onto real property. Thus, the contractor is required 
to convert that tangible personal property into real property 
and the tax is imposed on that consumption of the tangible 
personal property by the contractor. Therefore, to avoid sales 
and use tax on materials used for a furnish and install 
contract, the contract must be modified through the execution 
and implementation of change orders. When those change orders 
have been executed and implemented, the modified contract must 
make it clear that the materials in question have been 
separately purchased and provided by the exempt organization 
and that the contractor' s only duty with respect to those 
materials is to provide the labor to install those materials. 
22. For the purchases of materials and supplies to be 
exempt from sales and use tax, the exempt entity must make the 
purchase and title to the purchased items must pass to the 
exempt entity prior to the time it is attached to real 
property. The exempt entity must deal with the purchased items 
as its own property and treat those items the same as it would 
treat items it purchases for its own use and consumption. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of 
tangible personal property, but also upon "tangible personal 
property stored, used or consumed in this state." (U.C.A. 
59-12-103C1]). In the construction business, when a person 
uses lumber, bricks, cement, steel, nails, and other materials 
to construct a building or other improvements to real estate, 
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that person has used those materials and has converted the 
materials into real property. That conversion of tangible 
personal property into real property is deemed to be the 
consumption or use of the tangible personal property, which is 
the taxable event. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that sales and 
use tax is imposed upon the party that converts tangible 
personal property into real property. Utah Concrete Products 
Corp. v. State Tax Commission, supra, Olson Construction Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, supra, and Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, supra. The party that makes rhat 
conversion from tangible personal property to real property has 
used or consumed that property, is the real property 
contractor, and is taxed on that property. If that conversion 
to real property is performed by anyone except an exempt 
entity, the use and consumption of the converted materials is 
subject to sales and use tax. If the conversion to real 
property is performed by an exempt entity acting as the real 
property contractor, the use and consumption of the converted 
materials is not subject to sales and use tax. 
Therefore, the primary issue in this case is to determine 
whether the Petitioner or BYU was the real property 
contractor. If a preponderance of the evidence indicates that 
Petitioner was the party that converted the tangible personal 
property into real property, then Petitioner was the real 
property contractor and is liable for the tax assessed by the 
Auditing Division. However, if a preponderance of the evidence 
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indicates that BYU was the party that converted the tangible 
personal property into real property then BYU was the real 
property contractor and was exempt from the sales and use tax. 
To determine which party was the real property contractor, 
it is necessary to review and analyze the full scope of the 
contract and the legal rights, duties, obligations, and 
relationships of the parties with respect to the materials 
converted into real property. The primary evidence available 
to the Commission to make that determination is the contract 
and agreement, together with all duly executed change orders 
and other written documents. Oral testimony is beneficial in 
interpreting the documents and gaining some insight into the 
conduct of the parties and, to some extent, their understanding 
of the requirements of the contract. However, where any 
inconsistencies may exist between the written contract, 
including executed change orders, and either the conduct or 
oral testimony of any person, the written contract is normally 
presumed to govern or prevail. 
In this proceeding, a preponderance of the evidence shows 
that the legal rights, duties and obligations of BYU raised BYU 
to the level of the real property contractor because BYU 
assumed sufficient burdens, risks, responsibilities and 
incidents of ownership of the materials being converted to real 
property. BYU created a special purchase order form to be used 
only to purchase tax exempt materials for use in construction 
projects, and BYU issued those purchase orders. BYU paid for 
those purchases with its own checks. BYU had its own 
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supervisory personnel who had substantial responsibilities with 
respect to the materials. They were required to inspect and 
approve the materials for both quantity and quality. Those 
supervisors had general supervisory responsibility on the job 
and had the right to give instructions and directions to the 
contractor, and even the authority to stop work on the projects 
if the work was not being properly performed or if the 
materials being used were unacceptable. They had authority to 
approve or reject the construction superintendent hired by the 
general contractor, and even the right to withhold payments 
from the general contractor under certain conditions. 
Once the materials were received, BYU participated in the 
storage of the materials by providing fencing and having its 
campus security police patrol the area to help prevent theft 
and damage. BYU sometimes negotiated reduced prices or price 
discounts on the materials which resulted in prices that were 
lower than the price which had been bid to the general 
contractor, and BYU benefited from the reduced prices. BYU did 
not deduct a retainage on the materials which it purchased, 
whereas it deducted a 10% retainage on materials provided by 
Petitioner. If BYU overpaid any invoices, they could not 
deduct the overpayments from the amounts due to Petitioner, but 
obtained its own refunds from the suppliers. BYU retained all 
excess materials and pursued all warranties on the materials. 
BYU hired independent inspectors to review and assure the 
quality of the steel and some other materials, and they carried 
the insurance on the materials. In summary, it does appear 
that BYU assumed nearly all of the burdens, risks, 
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responsibilities and incidents of ownership of those 
materials. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence indicates 
that BYU converted those materials from tangible personal 
property into real property. Therefore, BYU was the real 
property contractor for those materials and pursuant to Rule 
R865-19-58S was exempt from the sales and use tax on those 
materials. 
In this proceeding, the primary area of concern to the 
Commission is the non-adherence to the contract between the 
parties. That contract between BYU and Petitioner required 
Petitioner to provide the materials and install the materials 
on the projects. Change orders were permitted by the contract, 
and change orders were prepared and executed on some, but not 
all, of the materials purchased by BYU. Under the rules of the 
Commission and the Conclusions of Law stated above, the 
materials on which change orders were not prepared or executed 
would be purchases of Petitioner and Petitioner would have 
consumed the materials when they were converted to real 
property, and therefore, Petitioner would be responsible for 
the tax on those materials. 
Petitioners position on that issue is that Petitioner and 
BYU had a very unique relationship, and because of their course 
of dealing for more than twenty years there was a unique trust 
and respect between them. BYU has concurred with those 
representations of the Petitioner. Both BYU and Petitioner 
testified that it was their intent for BYU to purchase the 
materials in question and to assume most of the risks with 
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respect to those materials. They further testified that even 
on those materials on which change orders were not prepared or 
executed, the conduct of the parties by BYU purchasing and 
providing the materials demonstrated their contractual intent, 
and mutual consent to modify the contract by their performance 
even though changes were not made in the written 
documentation. The testimony of the parties is supported by 
their conduct. BYU did assume the burdens, risks and 
responsibilities for the materials even though they were not 
contractually required to do so because the change orders had 
not been executed. 
The Commission has some reservations about those arguments, 
but because the conduct of the parties supports their 
testimony, in the absence of clarity in the rules that the 
written contract will prevail over the conduct or actions of 
the parties, the Commission is inclined to accept that position 
for retroactive, but not prospective, interpretation of the 
construction contracts for these projects. There is other 
substantial evidence to indicate that BYU did in fact buy the 
materials and assumed most of the burdens, risks, 
responsibilities, and incidents of ownership. 
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Based upon the foregoing, it is the order of the Utah State 
Tax Commission that the Petition for Redetermination is hereby 
granted and the audit assessment made by the Auditing Division 
is reversed and set aside. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 9 day of 7/^ yfc/M 19^i\ 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
R. H. Hansen 
Lirman 
B. Pacheco 
:ommissioner 
S. Blaine Willes* 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
*Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine Davis 
has been replaced by S. Blaine Willes. Commissioner Willes has 
been duly advised of the facts and circumstances regarding this 
case, and is qualified to sign this decision. 
GBD/wj/2679w 
r(ScAL). 
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